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ABSTRACT
From its origins in 1944 the World Bank has been one of the foremost agents of 
sustainable growth throughout the developing world. Increasingly the Bank has been very 
active combating poverty in sub-Saharan Africa, historically one of the world’s poorest 
regions. This study focuses on the World Bank rather than the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) because the Bank is the driving force of development in Africa. Although the 
Bank is a major actor in the socio-economic landscape of southern Africa (Botswana, 
Zambia, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Namibia and 
Lesotho), there have been few qualitative studies done, examining the Banks 
effectiveness in Lesotho. The following questions will guide my research analysis with 
regards to the Bank and the developmental relationship it has with Lesotho. My research 
questions are: has the Bank been effective in fulfilling its stated health care 
developmental objectives as outlined in the 1995 Poverty Reduction Action Plan? If so, 
how has it been effective? If not, what can be done to make it more effective? Does the 
Bank recognise the importance of local developmental goals? This study proposes to use 
qualitative methods to assess the effectiveness of the 1995 Poverty Reduction Action 
Plan, focusing specifically on the health sector as a component of the PRP. 
Approximately three months were spent in the field conducting research primarily 
through interviews and through the use of indigenous sources. Interviews will be 
conducted with those (i.e. doctors, health professionals) directly affected or influenced by 
the Banks efforts to reduce poverty. Following research in the field, if need be, this paper 
will attempt to suggest alternative methods to enhance the overall effectiveness of the 
Banks policy implementation. This study was also undertaken with the intention of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
testing whether the coordination and implementation of aid were major determinants of 
the general effectiveness of aid. Moreover, on a macro level, the results of this analysis 
should support theories posited by other notable scholars on the subject of developmental 
aid and its effectiveness.
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I. THEORIZING POVERTY REDUCTION PROGRAMMES
What is development? For many academics this question can be answered in numerous 
ways: capitalists would argue that development should promote evolutionary change and 
economic growth, while socialists would argue that development should focus on 
‘promoting’ basic human needs, Marxists on the other hand look at development as 
fundamentally promoting a classless society bent on revolutionary change. An 
appropriate theory on development has no concrete meaning, no widely accepted 
definition, in essence development can mean whatever one needs it to mean. 
Development can be viewed through numerous lenses: academics view development 
through different disciplines, professions and perspectives. Despite all these different 
lenses, the notion of poverty reduction however one chooses to define it, can easily fall 
under the broader definition of development.
The international financial institutions that dominate the contemporary socio­
economic landscape do a lot of good under the blanket term of development. With this 
comes the idea the development is inherently a good thing, or a positive step in the right 
direction: assisting those primarily in the developing world in a progression towards a 
universal “good.” Even this idea of a universal “good” is subjective to those in different 
parts of the world. For example what is good for a multinational corporation may not be 
good for a village chief in Zimbabwe. However using the premise that development is 
inherently positive, the overall promotion of development in the developing world has 
grown over the last few years.
To give this notion of development a more indigenous feel: James Ferguson in his 
1994 text The Anti-Politics Machine: “Development, ” Depoliticization and Bureaucratic
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Power in Lesotho highlights the conceptual inconsistencies in defining ‘development.’ 
Ferguson argues that there are two notions of development, the first, relates development 
to the ‘forces of production,’ that is the concept of development as a progression towards 
modem capitalism. The second notion of development that Ferguson reviews is a more 
contemporary outlook on development, development as poverty alleviation, or improving 
the quality of life.
E. Stewart notes “the very notion of ‘development’ in fact, presupposes a 
commitment to materialism, change, progress, and science, which are basically Western 
values.”1 Development in this sense becomes a means to an end; a means to achieving a 
Western-type growth both economically and socially; it is also interesting to note that the 
term ‘development’ is commonly associated with the developing world. Very rarely does 
one hear of ‘development models’ being applied to the United States, Canada or the 
European Union, because by modem standards they have fully developed, they are part 
of the ‘North’ and the developing world is part of the ‘South.’ The ‘North’ referring to 
countries located primarily in the northern hemisphere that “tend to be more 
economically advanced than their southern counterparts.”2
No discussion of development is complete without examining the contradictions 
that the term presents. Historically development has been a battle between two rationales, 
tradition and modernity: with “tradition” in the developing world being the problem or an 
obstacle to development: conversely “modernization” through agents of the West being 
the solution. The theories are numerous, all battling to weigh the pros and cons of 
tradition versus modernization against each other, but where academics come to a general
1 Allen Merriam, “What does ‘Third World’ mean?” The Third World. States o f Mind and Being. (Boston:
Unwin Hyman), 16.
2 Merriam, 18.
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consensus is that traditionally development was and continues to be a top-down process. 
What this means is that the decision making process is controlled by the International 
Financial Institutions, which are predominantly located in the West, examples of major 
institutions include the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank (WB).
The top-down approach to development uses the assumption that foreign aid, 
through these institutions, will ‘trickle down’ and serve the greater population in a 
positive manner. Positive in the sense of increased returns to the aid or productivity, 
because in the majority of situations foreign aid is given a monetary value, and the best 
way to measure monetary value is through productivity. All things said, the coordination 
between these institutions and the governments receiving this aid determines the extent to 
which this aid is effective. Poor coordination in even the most promising situation can 
and most likely will lead to failure.
The opposite approach to top-down development is the bottom-up approach to 
development. This approach calls for primarily “attention to health and education, but 
also to more effectively locally based problem solving techniques.”3 Attention is paid to 
health and education because one would imagine that they contribute substantially to the 
overall notion of community development through the notion of self-help. In this 
situation, the role of the institutions is that of a catalyst in promoting self-sufficiency 
rather than that of a decision maker. In the contemporary world Non-Governmental 
Organizations dominate the institutions that use this approach.
Two things become apparent here. Firstly, when conceptualising development for 
a study of foreign aid and its effectiveness, development can be anything that promotes
3 Jan Black, Development in Theory and Practice: Paradigms and Paradoxes 2nd Ed (Colorado: Westview 
Press, 1999), 21.
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the idea of progression. Secondly, the primary agent of development in the developing 
world is the state. Be it the state working along side bilateral and multilateral agents, be it 
the state working with individual entrepreneurs in a free market society, be it the state 
working with the public sector or be it the state working on its own in a highly 
centralized economy, the state is the fundamental agent of development.
For the purposes of this analysis, ‘development’ shall be defined in accordance
with Ferguson’s second notion of development:
Development is taken to mean improvement in quality of  
life or standard o f living, and the elimination or alleviation 
o f poverty.4
This definition was chosen primarily because it is more ‘in line’ with the stated goals and 
objectives of the major international institutions. For example, the World Bank states that 
its mandate is to “reduce poverty and improve living standards through sustainable 
growth and investment in people.”5 This definition also embodies a certain degree of 
totality to it, totality in a humanitarian socio-economic way. Any attempt to come to a 
conclusive definition of development is handicapped by competing and contradicting 
theorists and scholars. One feels that the definition offered by Ferguson presupposes 
nothing. In other words the definition offered, while signifying a progression can be 
applied to the developed world and the developing world, and still retains the same 
meaning. Other notions of development assume some sort of movement or modernization 
to the West, when really what developing countries need is not to be modernized along 
Western tenets but developed to ensure sustainability.
4 James Ferguson, The Anti-Politics Machine: “Development.” Depoliticization and Bureaucratic Power in
Lesotho (Minneapolis: University o f  Minnesota Press, 1994), 55.
5 World Bank, “The World Bank’s Mission.” Feb 17. Online.
http://www.worldbank.org/povertv/mission/index.htm
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The argument in brief then is the following: the World Bank as the foremost 
agent of development has over the last decade been very active in combating poverty 
around the globe, specifically in the more under-developed areas of the world, i.e. sub- 
Saharan Africa. The Bank has committed foreign aid both financially and technically to 
reducing poverty in the Kingdom of Lesotho through various projects and initiatives. One 
of these initiatives the 1995 Poverty Reduction Action Plan (PRP), provided a 
comprehensive review of poverty in Lesotho, and made policy recommendations: one of 
them being investment in human resources as a means to poverty reduction.
Investment in human resources can come in many forms, encompassing various 
socio-economic sectors. This study will focus on the investments made in the health 
sector as a component of the PRP, in the process assessing whether or not the project was 
successful in fulfilling its stated objectives. The question of foreign aid and its 
effectiveness will bring into play two other factors that exist in the relationship between 
donor and recipient, namely coordination and implementation. The short answer to the 
question of the significance of coordination is found on two levels. Coordination between 
the Bank and the government and coordination between government (as the principal 
agent of development) and the health care professionals is inadequate. Theoretically 
while implementation of policies is a responsibility of government, good coordination 
leads to better communication which enhances implementation. Therefore, simply put, if 
the Bank and the government are not on the “same page” so to speak when it comes to 
the implementation of proposed policies, nothing concrete can be achieved. As this study 
will ultimately illustrate, both coordination and implementation are crucial to the 
effectiveness of foreign aid, particularly in a country like Lesotho.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
6
The methodology for this study is fairly simple. It will be a qualitative study, with 
the primary mode of research being interviews, those interviewed will be health 
professionals and health administrators in Lesotho. The results of these interviews will be 
consolidated and contrasted against the stated goals of the 1995 PRP.
With the amount of theorizing that there is in the development world, 
there seems to be an inherent trend in development circles to separate the ‘reality’ of 
development (extreme poverty) from the theory and practice of development assistance 
through foreign aid. However, when all is said and done, foreign aid cannot be separated 
categorically; the reality, theory and practice of foreign aid should be embodied in one 
concept of development, in which we assume that countries of the periphery, including 
newly industrialized countries have a problem (i.e. economic stagnation) and that they are 
the problem (i.e. political problems); foreign aid will likely succeed if it is taken in its 
totality and applied consciously, through adequate channels and proper coordination. For 
the purposes of this paper it should be noted that the primary objective is to examine the 
effectiveness of project specific aid and not ‘national’ or country specific aid.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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INTRODUCTION
Just as defining development should include a certain degree of totality, it is essential for 
this study to outline the perceived role of the World Bank, and what this role signifies in 
its relationship with Lesotho. By providing a theoretical overview of the Bank, the 
‘foreign aid regime,’ democracy and Lesotho this chapter will show that the current 
socio-economic and political path of development that Lesotho is on, combined with 
Lesotho’s unfortunate position of being a small, landlocked and economically weak 
country has throughout time increased its dependency on developmental aid. This 
dependency has manifested itself into an intensification of what can essentially be called 
a patron-client relationship.
Quite often the relationship between international institution and ‘developing’ 
country develops into a patron-client relationship: defined as an arrangement between an 
individual who has authority, social status, wealth, or some other personal resource (the 
patron) and another person who benefits from his or her support or influence (the client).6 
When looking at the developmental relationship that exists between the Bank and 
Lesotho it is clear to see that the World Bank is the patron and Lesotho is the client.
The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the original 
institution of what is now the World Bank (WB) was founded at the Bretton Woods 
conference in 1944. Initially the Bank’s function was to provide funds for the post-World 
War II reconstruction of Europe: it is in this era that the acceptance of aid as an 
irreplaceable component of the contemporary world economy began. In 1960, the 
International Development Association (IDA) was created to loan money to developing
6 Hyper Dictionary. “Patron Client Relationship Definition.” 2 Nov 2003. Online. Available from 
http://www.hvperdictionarv.com/dictionarv/patron+client+relationship
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
8
countries, it is with the introduction of the IDA, that the Bank began moving rapidly 
“from postwar reconstruction to economic development, and by the end of the decade the 
shift was complete.”7 As time went on, the Bank evolved into distributing long terms 
loans for development, these loans often required no payment for at least ten years. 
Today’s Bank is comprised of five separate economic entities: the IBRD, the IDA, the 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), the International
Q
Finance Corporation (IFC), and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), 
collectively known as the World Bank Group. However in the context of foreign aid, IFC 
and MIGA are not considered as aid institutions.
The World Bank Group’s current stated mandate is to fight poverty and improve 
the living standards of people in the developing world. A key component of this mandate 
is that the Bank works with partners in an attempt to reduce poverty: these partners tend 
to be governments and other international aid agencies or institutions. Recently the Bank 
and other multilateral and bilateral institutions developed the Millennium Development 
Goals, designed specifically to combat poverty globally. The Bank primarily acts as a 
developmental bank that provides developing countries with technical assistance, 
developmental loans and policy advice.9
From an administrative standpoint, the Bank raises funds by borrowing from the 
international capital market, the Bank then issues bonds, which are a very safe investment 
as they have the highest bond rating (AAA).10 Additional capital is derived from member
7 Mike Mason, Development and Disorder: A History o f  the Third World since 1945 (Toronto: Between
The Lines, 1997), 424.
8 World Bank, World Bank History. Accessed 28 October 2003; available from
http:// web.worldbank.org/wbsite/extemal/extaboutus/extarchives
9 World Bank. “World Bank Homepage.” 28 October 2003. Online. Available from www.worldbank.org
10 The Asia Development Bank, Africa Development Bank and Caribbean Development Bank also have
(AAA) bonds.
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countries subscriptions in capital shares. The Bank is governed by a board of governors
comprising representatives from each member country. As previously noted, the
introduction of the Millennium Development Goals has led to the Bank strengthening its
focus on poverty reduction as the overall objective of all its work. This could not have
come at a better time, current poverty trends predict that by 2015, 345 million people in
sub-Saharan Africa will earn under $1 per day.11
The aid regime is better understood as a facet 
of the trade practices o f the dominant economies 
that have guaranteed the subordination o f many 
economies of the third world.12
The idea of foreign aid as a means to development took flight in the post-war era.
The American generated Marshall Plan contributed approximately $13 billion13 to the
reconstruction of Europe over four years. In the developing world the foreign aid regime
flourished on two distinct levels: aid was used to either destroy independence movements
through the promotion of ‘democracy’ (Malaysia and Indochina) or as a “hammerlock to
hold Third World countries in place as dependent associates in a U.S. - dominated
system.”14 By U.S. dominance Mason is referring to the fact that the IMF and World
Bank were at the time dominated ideologically by the United States.
Therefore the view that a foreign aid regime can create a dependency and evolve
into a patron-client relationship is founded on the principle belief that habitual aid was a
vehicle for the promotion of Western interests. The literature review provides more
concrete examples o f  foreign aid and its effectiveness; however one feels that it is
necessary to briefly explore the tensions that exist between development and democracy
11 Jehan Arulpragasam and Giovanna Prennushi, Poverty Reduction and the World Bank: Progress in
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as it relates to the effectiveness of foreign aid: more specifically the tension that exists 
between western notions of development and democracy and ‘Africanized’ versions of 
development and democracy.
Using western lenses, the ‘strengthening’ or promotion of democracy in the 
developing world has historically been seen as the strengthening of civil society, and the 
effect that this has on the developmental process. Freer civil society equals more civil 
liberties. In an African context, Harold Fisher stresses the importance of the ‘citizen,’ 
noting that “the citizen must come to feel that he or she has an important role in society 
and can take part in governance in some way.”15 For project and policy effectiveness, it is 
important that an institution like the Bank has a good working relationship with Non- 
Governmental Organizations and other such actors because this can to a certain extent 
determine the path of development for national civil societies: which the west uses as a 
measuring stick for democracy. When exploring the relationship between democracy and 
economic liberalization (another way of defining development), using international 
financial institutions as a backdrop, it is essential to recognise the relationship or lack of a 
relationship between foreign aid and democracy: foreign aid in this context being the 
means towards economic liberalization.
Following the independence movements in Africa and Latin America in the 
1960’s and 1970’s the worlds multilateral and bilateral institutions have increasingly 
included the promotion of democracy as a major focus of their developmental goals 
(often as part of conditionality attached to loans). The ideology of certain African 
countries post independence tended to be more Socialist (Zimbabwe, Central African
15 Harold Fisher, Democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa: Problems. Advances, and Prospects (London:
Greenwood Press, 2001), 122.
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Republic and Ghana to name a few) and Marxist (Tanzania, Benin and Angola). For the 
majority of these African countries that sought aid following independence, a move to 
capitalism and democracy was required: closer relations with the west would 
undoubtedly lead to increased foreign investment and economic liberalization. Therefore 
the donor -  recipient relationship comes into play, especially when dealing with foreign 
aid. When examining this relationship, different ‘developmental’ trajectories are 
influenced by levels of clientelism, tribalism and clan-politics.
Essentially what all this background information on aid, democracy and the 
World Bank does is provide a springboard to leap into the history of foreign aid in 
Lesotho. Foreign aid has played a very important role in the development of Lesotho, 
partly because the socio-economic conditions that have led to Lesotho being labelled a 
“developmental challenge” by the World Bank, have persisted following its 
independence.
The Kingdom of Lesotho is a small, overpopulated, landlocked country in 
southern Africa completely surrounded by South Africa. Lesotho currently has a 
population of 1.8 million and an area of approximately 30, 000 square kilometres.16 It is 
desperately short of economic resources, and traditional rural activities dominate
1 7providing income for approximately 85 percent of the population. To say Lesotho is a 
very poor country, is an understatement. In 2000 the gross national product (GNP) per 
capita was $540, approximately eighty percent of Lesotho’s population lives in rural, 
mountainous areas. As previously mentioned earlier, Lesotho’s economy is “based on
16 CIA: The World Fact Book, “Lesotho.” 4 Nov 2003. Online. Available from
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/lt.html
17 World Bank, Lesotho: A Developmental Challenge (Washington DC: Library o f Congress, 1975), 1.
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limited agricultural and pastoral production,”18 and is completely economically 
dependant on South Africa. Lesotho became a member of the Bank in 1968 and to date 
the Bank has assisted Lesotho with numerous projects, including projects in: agriculture, 
transportation, education, health and community development. The first Bank initiative 
was a transportation project in 1966, with the most recent being a health sector reform 
initiative started in 2002.19
The importance of colonialism in Lesotho’s developmental history can not be 
underestimated. Lesotho gained independence from the British in 1966 and “became an 
independent constitutional monarchy”20 that same year. Briefly, Lesotho is a 
constitutional monarchy, one of only three monarchies in Africa. The bi-cameral multi­
party Parliament consists of a National Assembly, whose 120 Members are elected by 
universal suffrage, and a Senate comprising 22 principal chiefs and 11 other persons 
nominated by the King.21 As from the most recent general election, in May 2002, 
Members of the National Assembly are elected under a proportional system combining 
80 members elected to individual constituencies on a first-past-the post system and 40 
members elected according to the share of the national vote gained by each party.
Lesotho inherited no economic or political infrastructure to speak of: this 
is primarily because the British government did not introduce any modem forms of 
development, expecting that Lesotho, at some stage would be incorporated into South 
Africa, and assuming that it would more or less be automatically developed as an indirect
18 Fareed Hassan, Lesotho: Development in a Challenging Environment. (Washington: The International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2002), 2.
19 World Bank. “Lesotho Country Information.” 2 Nov 2003. Online. Available from
www. worldbank. or g/afr/ls2 .htm
20 Hassan, 1.
21 World Bank. “Lesotho Country Information.” 2 Nov 2003. Online. Available from
www.worldbank.org/aff/ls2.htm
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effect of the strong expansionary forces in South Africa. As a result, institutional capacity 
was not developed. In a direct attempt to encourage economic development, the British, 
in 1966 sent a mission, better known as the ‘Porter Mission’ to Lesotho to determine 
external assistance needs for more vigorous socioeconomic development.22 P. Welling 
notes that between 1966 and 1967 total British aid to Lesotho rose to a peak of R8.6 
million.23 Thus, one can see that as early as 1966, there was this immediate reliance or 
dependence on outside actors to provide economic assistance.
Before one delves into the intricacies of Lesotho’s foreign aid, it is important to 
note that not all of the Bank’s developmental aid to Lesotho is financial. The majority of 
the Bank’s aid to Lesotho is and continues to be knowledge based; by this one refers to 
aid in the form of analytical and technical assistance through such task forces as the 
Strategic Economic Options Report (SEOR). The SEOR for example was responsible for 
compiling data on several sectors (including health) and “played a part in the World 
Bank’s dialogue with the government on development priorities.”24 It was through the 
SEOR that the 1994 Country Assessment (CAS) was formulated, which led to the 1995 
Poverty Reduction Action Plan. It should be noted that how a country is assessed is 
determined by external formulations.
Khabele Matlotsa notes that aid is one of the most valuable external resources for 
landlocked and resource poor Lesotho.25 The question that needs to be asked here is why 
is aid such a valuable commodity to Lesotho? Granted Lesotho has no vast reserves of
22 World Bank, 3.




Khabele Matlotsa, “Aid, Development and Democracy in Lesotho,” Southern African Regional Institute 
for Policy Studies (SARIPS), Zimbabwe, 1999.
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mineral wealth but the country has been and continues to be in an economic relationship 
with South Africa, Botswana, Namibia and Swaziland (The South African Customs 
Union, SACU), and through SACU, Lesotho enjoys the benefits of shared revenues and 
preferential access to South African markets, particularly in agriculture. Therefore critics 
argue, why such a large dependency on foreign aid?
The evolution of the aid regime in Lesotho began post-independence. There is an 
important historical aspect underlying the evolution of this aid regime, but for the 
purposes of this introduction a brief summary should serve as the foundation to explain 
the emergence of the patron-client relationship between the Bank and Lesotho. Lesotho’s 
aid sources multiplied in the 1970’s as direct a result of the political climate of the then 
apartheid South Africa: the international community felt sympathy for this country 
surrounded by South Africa:26 and consequently sought to assist through economic and 
developmental aid.
James Ferguson in his excellent account of development and politicization in 
Lesotho notes that between 1975-1984 Lesotho was receiving developmental assistance 
from several bilateral sources including; Australia, Canada, Korea, Iran, Norway, United 
Kingdom and the United States. However during this same time period, Lesotho was also 
receiving aid from several multilateral institutions, including several non and quasi- 
govemmental organizations.27
The second evolution of the aid regime occurred in 1986 following the military 
coup, which saw a military junta replace a civilian government. This had a significant
26 Lesotho used the 1976 Soweto uprising to acquire more external assistance, due to the fact that many
South Africans were fleeing their country to go to Lesotho.
27 James Ferguson, The Anti-Politics Machine: Development. Depoliticization, and Bureaucratic Power in
Lesotho. (London: University o f  Minnesota Press, 1994), 6.
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effect on aid flows to the country. The military coup coincided with the distinct push of 
structural adjustment loans by the Bank, as a result donors began to emphasise 
implementation of economic liberalisation and economic pluralism. Ultimately the 
military regime succumbed to donor pressure by withdrawing from political power in
9 8  .1993: so the influence of donors led to the re-institutionalisation of democratic rule. Aid 
in the 1990’s was delivered by the Bank in an uncertain political climate, and some critics 
argue that this weakened the effectiveness of assistance programs.
Historically aid has played an important role in the development of Lesotho. Over 
the last thirty years, the Bank has completed 28 projects in Lesotho, and as of 2003 there 
are currently 21 active projects.29 This is fairly significant in a country that is slightly 
smaller than the state of Maryland. With all this aid flowing into Lesotho, one recalls a 
theory introduced by Milton Friedman who essentially believes that too much aid leads to 
negative economic growth, and is therefore counterproductive. Over the last thirty years, 
the Bank has contributed approximately $448 million for the 28 projects, of which $78 
million has gone towards education; $178 million has gone towards water sanitation, $36 
million to urban development and $15.6 towards health and nutrition.30
Exploring this notion of a patron client relationship further: to exist there has to be 
an unequal relationship, be it economic, social or political between patron and client. 
James C. Scott argues that there has to be an imbalance in exchange between two
1
‘trading’ partners, this imbalance reflecting the disparity in their relative wealth. The
28 Matlotsa, 3.
29 World Bank. “Lesotho Country Information.” 2 Nov 2003. Online. Available from
www.worldbank.org/aff/ls2.htm
30 Hassan, 21.
31 James Scott, “Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia,” American Political Science
Review LXVI, no. 1 (1972) :93.
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World Bank has for the current year (2003) provided $18.5 billion in developmental 
assistance worldwide. In direct contrast, Lesotho’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for 
2002 was $2, 700 and 49% of the country lives under the poverty line:32 the poverty line 
being those living on less than $1 a day. Over the last five years (1998-2003) Lesotho has 
received $85 million in official developmental assistance from the Bank. There is an 
obvious disparity in the relative wealth of the World Bank and Lesotho.
A patron according to Scott is one who operates with the resources that are 
available to them. The Bank raises almost all its money from the financial markets, in 
2002 it managed to raise $23 billion, thus it has a considerable amount of resources 
available to it at any given time. The Bank theoretically is able to use these resources 
over time to perpetuate the existing patron client relationship with Lesotho. It has already 
been established that Lesotho as the ‘client’ has no substantial resources of any kind that 
would allow the country to remove itself from this relationship. In fact one could argue 
that there are incentives for Lesotho to remain in this relationship, without assistance 
from the Bank, the existing infrastructure in Lesotho at least theoretically would not be 
able to cope economically or socially.
Over time the relationship between the World Bank and Lesotho has evolved into 
a delicate patron-client relationship, with both sides benefiting from the relationship. 
More precisely, by establishing clientage relations, the Bank (as the patron) has been able 
to secure a readily available, trustworthy recipient country, which enables the Bank to 
economize by giving out loans: economize through the notion of conditionality, 
conditions attached to loans. The idea of conditionality is discussed further in the
32 CIA: The World Fact Book, “Lesotho.” 4 Nov 2003. Online. Available from
http://www.cia.gov/cia/Dublications/factbook/geos/lt.html
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literature review with regards to aid effectiveness. Joseph Stiglitz notes that 
conditionality almost always ensures that loans are repaid, but quite often conditionality
-1-5
turns the loan into a policy tool. So the question then becomes can policy tools be used 
for perhaps promoting the tenets of Western ideology, namely market liberalization and 
democracy? As for the client (Lesotho), by entering into such a relationship, Lesotho 
obtains guaranteed access to economic and social aid or other various kinds of flexible 
assistance provided by the Bank. This relationship has developed because both sides have 
consistently gained what they want.
The intensification of this relationship can be examined according to total external 
debt owed to the World Bank by Lesotho. Currently Lesotho owes the Bank $638 
million34, however over the last twenty year period, Lesotho’s total external debt to all 
multilateral and bilateral institutions was: $8.2 million (1973), $34 million (1979), $128 
million (1983), $512 million (1993) and $712 million (1999).35 Of the $712 million 
owed, approximately $185 million is owed to IDA, and $56 million to the IBRD. 
Therefore, it can clearly be seen that there has been a gradual increase in Lesotho’s 
external debt over the last twenty years. Naturally as the debt increases, the patron has 
more incentive to loan more and the client has more incentive to seek further assistance 
in an attempt to alleviate the burden of the debt.
The foreseeable future looks relatively bleak if one considers that southern Africa 
over the last two years has experienced massive drought and famine. This has serious 
implications for a country like Lesotho whose rural community relies heavily on
33 Joseph Stiglitz, Globalization and its Discontents. (New York: Norton Paperback, 2002), 44.
34 World Bank Document. “Lesotho at a Glance.” 2 Nov 2003. Online. Available from
http://www.worldbank.org/data/countrvdata/aag/lso aag.pdf
35 World Bank, World Tables 1995. (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1995), 418.
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agriculture for subsistence. With food shortages a likely outcome, this will only serve to 
intensify the existing patron client relationship. Lesotho has received $41 million in food 
aid over the last year to serve an estimated 500, 000 people.36 Food shortages lead to 
greater health issues, which in-tum strain the existing health infrastructure. In Lesotho 
there are only a handful major hospitals, the most prominent being the district hospital 
Queen Elizabeth II hospital, located in the capital Maseru. There are others i.e. Leribe 
trauma unit and Mohale’s Hoek district hospital to name a few.
Lesotho’s current developmental path will increase its dependency on aid, while 
at the same time negating the effectiveness of this aid, although with a little internal ‘fine 
tuning’ by the Bank, aid could potentially have a greater effect. While Lesotho receives a 
significant amount of aid, inefficient government bureaucracy (lack of coordination and 
implementation) and limited absorptive capacity for foreign assistance impede Lesotho’s 
efforts to sustain long terms growth and reduce poverty. This is not a measure of the aid, 
but it is a measure of effectiveness of the aid. Ineffective aid perpetuates patron client 
relationships, because where aid fails, more developmental aid is borrowed to ‘make up’ 
for that lost aid.
As previously mentioned the 1995 Poverty Reduction Action Plan (PRP) was part 
of the Strategic Economic Options Report (SEOR) employed by the Bank; in this case the 
PRP was a joint project between the Lesotho government, the Lesotho Council of Non 
Governmental Organizations, the European Union, USAID and the World Bank. The 
PRP was designed to be a medium term (1995-2000) strategy with the World Bank 
providing most of the technical, financial, analytical expertise that went into the PRP.
36 BBC News. “Food Aid reaches famine hit Swaziland.” 3 Nov 2003. Online. Available from
http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/world/africa/2171156.stm
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The emphasis of this particular PRP was on poverty reduction through private sector 
development, “improved social services and human resources.”37 This paper will examine 
the investments made in human resources, particularly in health care, by the World Bank 
and determine whether or not they were successful in meeting their stated goals. Briefly, 
the following were the four domestic goals set for health care through the 1995 PRP:
• Exempt children less than five from health fees
• Introduce a free basic health service
• Increase geographic equity
• Allow local facilities to retain certain fees38
In light of this my research questions are: has the World Bank been effective in 
fulfilling its developmental objectives stated in the 1995 Poverty Reduction Action Plan? 
By developmental objectives I refer to “characteristics” associated with the 
implementation of an effective health care administrative system; it should be noted that 
this not only involves the Bank, but the government of Lesotho. If so, how has it been 
effective? If not, what can be done to make it more effective? And lastly, does the Bank 
recognise the importance of the local developmental goals outlined in the PRP?
Understanding indigenous developmental objectives is crucial with regards to 
development in the health sector. Numerous examples illustrate how potential 
development schemes have failed because often donor and recipient country are not on 
the ‘same page’ when it comes to attainable objectives. The most notable example here 
comes in the form of Rwanda. In 1993 the French sold military arms to Rwanda which 
were subsequently used in the genocide in 1994. The irony here is that the French then 
sent medical aid, in the form of doctors and soldiers to protect those being annihilated.39
37 Hassan, 12.
38 1995 Poverty Reduction Action Plan taken from Table 3.1, Hassan, 12.
39 Mason, 435.
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As Lesotho and the Bank embrace globalization, that is, trans-national economic 
transactions and a more enhanced global awareness off poverty, Lesotho’s dependency 
on foreign donors such as the World Bank is bound to increase. This causal relationship 
between Lesotho and the World Bank provides the perfect contextual back drop to 
outline the parameters of aid effectiveness as it relates to this study. Before one does that, 
it is important to define several key terms.
For the purposes of this analysis poverty reduction shall be defined strictly as: a 
significant improvement, over time, in the sustainability o f the health care system. In light 
of this, one can ask the question can effectiveness be measured by the final outcome of a 
policy as it relates to health care. Or should effectiveness be a manifestation of a 
combination of economic and social attributes? Effectiveness can very easily be 
measured by macroeconomic variables, levels of rural development, levels of human 
capital development and by levels of private sector development: but effectiveness in this 
case is being measured as strengthening the long term ability of human resources: that is, 
the extent to which the health care system has evolved and is relatively free o f social and 
economic restraints. Key to this definition is the notion of long term as opposed to short 
term, when thinking of development, the emphasis should be on long term improvements 
and methods by which to sustain these improvements.
This is the most viable way of measuring a term that forms the backbone of this 
analysis because, as the literature review will show, effectiveness is dependant and can be 
defined based on a number of factors, and in order to minimise the discrepancies between 
the different factors it is necessary to consolidate characteristics of each factor into one 
working definition. In attempting to reach a conclusive definition of effectiveness it is
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inevitable that there will be large methodological pitfalls associated with this process.
However the current definition serves both micro (poverty alleviation) and macro
(economic growth) needs of development. Lastly, this study will not distinguish between
forms of Bank developmental aid: policy, project and sector aid will be brought under the
blanket terms ‘project’ or ‘project aid.’
The notion of poverty reduction is inherently a very misleading term. The Bank
and other such International Financial Institutions like to define poverty as living on less
than $1 a day. Michel Chossudovsky makes us aware that the Bank’s “one-dollar-a-day
criterion applies only to developing countries,”40 and along similar lines he asks what
about those people who live on less than $3 a day? Does that make them not poor?
The one-dollar-a-day standard has no rational 
basis: population groups in developing countries 
with per capita incomes o f two, three, or even five 
dollars remain poverty stricken (i.e., unable to 
meet basic expenditures on food, clothing, shelter, 
health and education).41
Quite often, particularly in the third world poverty reduction is measured by
looking at the development of infrastructure i.e. buildings for schools or furnishing
classrooms. However, will simply having more infrastructure alleviate poverty? It’s
almost absurd to think that building three buildings in rural Lesotho will eradicate the
poverty that exists there. Instead poverty reduction efforts should start from the bottom
and work up. For example if the Bank and other such organizations want to alleviate
poverty, then (especially in the context o f  Africa) they should focus on educating the
women.
40 Michel Chossudovsky, “Global Poverty in the Late 20lh Century.” Journal o f International Affairs 52.
no.l (1998): 300.
41 Chossudovsky, 296.
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This focus on women would be warranted primarily because in the ‘third world’ 
women are often seen as the backbone of long term development, particularly in Lesotho 
where there is this notion of the “gold widows:” ‘gold widows’ being Basotho women 
who are abandoned by their husbands who travel to South Africa to seek employment and 
a better wage in the various South African mines. As a result of this the women are left to 
bear the brunt of all the domestic chores. Grassroots education of the women will in the 
long run yield a greater return to investment that merely building schools and providing 
teachers.
This said, the health care system is a solid representation of the level of 
development a country has sustained. The health care system encompasses both social 
and economic factors, for example: access and equality (social) and cost (economic). The 
decision to focus on the health care system in Lesotho as a measure of aid effectiveness is 
therefore two-fold. First and foremost there are hardly a limited number of partners 
involved in financing the health sector in Lesotho. The Ministry of Health and Social 
Welfare works primarily with the Ireland Aid, Africa Development Bank and the World 
Bank to finance its projects.42 Secondly, upon examining the levels of aid that has gone to 
Lesotho, the health sector received only 3.5% of World Bank sectoral lending, which 
translates to US$15.6 million between 1966 and 1999: and the Bank readily admits that it 
“did not provide much relevant assistance in the health sector during the early 1990’s.”43
42 World Bank Project Information Document AB 277, 1.
43 Hassan, 29.
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II. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
The complex nature of social and economic change means that the impact of foreign aid 
cannot easily be separated from other interrelated factors. With this notion, the literature 
review will focus on scholarly literature regarding the general effectiveness of aid and 
World Bank aid, and in this regard will also analyse what is ‘considered’ to be effective. 
By aid, one does not solely mean capital, indeed aid (as previously stated) includes 
generating knowledge which can be utilised in the development process. In order to not 
be too reliant on World Bank resources for information, this review will balance Bank 
literature with other independent entities, be it independent authors or institutions. From 
an organizational standpoint, following a brief introduction this literature review will be 
divided into six sections. The first five sections will discuss the conditions that contribute 
to effective aid development as outlined by academics within the development field, 
namely: ownership, good policy environment in the recipient nation, fungibility, 
conditionality and institutional capacity.
It is imperative to note that, apart from the World Bank’s 1975 and 2002 studies, 
Lesotho: a Developmental Challenge and Lesotho: Development in a Challenging 
Environment, there is no concrete body of scholarly research on Lesotho and the effects 
of developmental aid. The challenge with constructing a scholarly literature review on the 
World Bank’s developmental objectives in Lesotho is perhaps best understood by James 
Ferguson, who in his 1994 study of rural development in Lesotho: The Anti-Politics 
Machine: “Development, ” Depoliticization and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho, ” argues 
that development institutions (World Bank, International Monetary Fund, Overseas 
Development Institution (UK) and other such institutions) spawn their own type of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
24
developmental “discourse,” and this “discourse simultaneously constructs Lesotho as a 
particular kind of object, and subsequently creates a structure of knowledge around that 
object,”44 in this case the type of knowledge being development oriented. As a side bar, 
development for this study has already been conceptualised as the improvement in quality 
of life or standard of living, and the elimination or alleviation of poverty. Hence the need 
to balance the literature review with Bank literature and independent literature, because 
to rely solely on World Bank literature would not be an accurate representation of foreign 
aid in the developing world.
One of the prominent themes in the paper is that the degree of coordination 
between the Bank and ‘third world’ (in this case, the government of Lesotho) is a very 
important determinant of aid success. Along with this, the coordination between local 
government and other agents of development is also a very important determinant of aid 
effectiveness. In the context of foreign aid and poverty reduction, the following chapter 
will also briefly address scholarly literature on the role of the African elite in promoting 
development. The inclusion of literature on elites may seem out of sorts, but in the 
context of development, elites have played and continue to play significant roles in nation 
and capacity building45 throughout the ‘developing’ world. Indeed “when donor financed 
projects fail it is often because of weak institutions and public organizations,”46 which is 
a direct reflection on the role of the elite, who are often the ones responsible for 
implementing the projects, and are often those that formulate domestic policy.
44 James Ferguson, The Anti-Politics Machine: “Development.” Depoliticization and Bureaucratic Power in
Lesotho (Minneapolis: University o f Minnesota Press, 1994), xiv.
45 Capacity building in this situation defined as strengthening the ability o f  institutions to improve their
overall performance.
45 World Bank, Assessing Aid: What Works. What Doesn’t and Why (Washington DC: Oxford University 
Press, 1998), 89.
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From a theoretical perspective numerous studies have documented the role and 
effectiveness of the World Banks aid, although as previously mentioned none have 
focused specifically on Lesotho. Notably the World Bank itself publishes yearly 
summaries of its operations around the world (World Development Reports and Country 
Assessment Strategies (CAS)). The Operations Evaluations Department (OED) also 
evaluates projects for the World Bank. The OED is an independent entity which reports 
directly to the Banks governing body (as opposed to the president). For example in a 
1989 Bank report, the OED concluded that 81% of all evaluated projects are performing 
satisfactorily, with an average economic return of 16%.47
More specifically, it is common for Bank projects in infrastructure to do much 
better than say projects in health and agriculture, as Cassen notes these results are fairly 
similar to other aid agencies who find that approximately two thirds of their projects 
produce satisfactory results.48 One of the foremost critiques of ‘in-house’ reviews by the 
Bank is that these evaluations tend to be self-serving, promoting the Bank as this 
‘unflawed entity.’ The Bank, to their credit, has gone to a significant amount of effort to 
ensure that this does not happen, by being more accountable for their project successes or 
failures.
The literature on the effectiveness of aid is replete with numerous studies (Baker, 
Burnside, Buckley and Killick to name a few) linking aid with several macro economic 
variables, such as economic growth, investment, taxation and other outcomes such as 
poverty.49 Luttik and White highlight one of the fundamental problems in constructing a
47 Tony Killick, “Developmental Effectiveness o f Aid to Africa,” World Bank Working Paper. (1991): 10.
48 Robert Cassen et al, Does Aid Work (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 307.
49 J. Luttik and H. White, “The Countrywide Effects o f Aid,” Policy Research Working Paper. (1994):
1337.
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literature review on the effectiveness of aid. The definition of effectiveness is relative to 
time, place and situation: and could be defined as anything from democratization levels to 
economic growth.
When looking at foreign aid historically, one can see that it has been able to 
transform entire sectors of the economy: for example the Green Revolution which forever 
changed the face of agriculture was financed in large part by foreign aid. Combinations 
of multilateral and bilateral aid have helped combat some of the world’s most rampant 
diseases, for example measles through child inoculation and river blindness in south-east 
Asia. However foreign aid has also been, as the Bank itself firmly puts it, “an unmitigated 
failure:”50 especially in Africa where corruption and bad governance have been some of 
the direct consequences of foreign aid.
Here the allocation of aid takes centre stage. Allocation of aid is an important ex­
factor in terms of determining the effectiveness of aid. Due to historical and socio­
political reasons foreign aid has not always gone to those countries that need it the most. 
If a country was a former colony i.e. India being a former British colony, it tended to 
receive more aid from the British than say Mozambique (being a former Portuguese 
colony) would. Likewise with the advent of the cold war, it was not a question of 
effective aid, but of supportive aid, aid was used to prop up regimes all around the globe, 
these regimes tended to be democratic and had open economies.
Zaire’s former leader, Mobuto Sese Seko allegedly amassed a personal fortune 
through economic exploitation and corruption, financed in part by ‘Western’ foreign aid. 
As Meredith Turshen succinctly points out “the policies of the US dominated IMF and
50 World Bank, Assessing Aid: What Works. What Doesn’t and Why (Washington DC: Oxford University
Press, 1998), 1.
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World Bank have caused a decline in national health care systems all over Africa.”51 This 
is in part due to a lack of coordination between USAID and the international financial 
institutions. Therefore it can be seen that foreign aid can be highly effective and highly 
ineffective, it all depends on the prevailing socio-economic conditions.
Arguments in the literature assessing the effectiveness of aid on poverty 
alleviation have been varied. Mosley puts forward the notion that the desire to help the 
poor “does not penetrate very far into administrative procedures, so that such help as the 
poor and destitute get from aid is largely adventitious.”52 Cassen however is more 
positive, and he argues that poverty-related projects have higher rates of return. However 
he too believes that aid projects can help the poor, as long as governments and donors are 
on the same page when it comes to implementation and sustainability. What then is the 
situation of aid in Africa?
Sub-Saharan Africa, as a region, throughout the 1980’s received more aid than
C '}
any other region in the world, yet levels of economic growth during this period declined 
substantially. So in this sense, one can conclude, like Killick, Holmgren and Knack that 
aid, in terms of economic growth has not been effective in sub-Saharan Africa. There is 
an entire body of literature dedicated to discussing the correlation or lack of, between aid 
and economic growth.
Another way to look at aid effectiveness in Africa is to take the methodology used 
by Lele and Jain, who looked at the extent to which donors and host governments 
interacted (in their particular case it was in agriculture): more specifically they looked at 
“the donors impact upon recipient’s abilities to choose and implement strategic
51 Merideth Turshen, “US Aid and AIDS in Africa.” Review o f African Political Economy 55 (1992): 95.
52 Paul Mosley, Overseas Aid: It’s Defence and Reform (Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books, 1987), 181.
53 Killick, 17.
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investments.”54 In their study, they concluded that even though donors have made 
invaluable contributions to development, they have not helped governments “face the 
inescapable hard work of constructing long term, country specific development 
strategies.”55
To add different voices to this debate, the Economic Commission of Africa 
(ECA) historically has been dissatisfied with the effectiveness of aid throughout the 
continent. However there are studies (United Nations Development Program 1989) that 
are favourable to foreign aid in Africa, noting that foreign aid has ostensibly improved 
policies, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. For comparative purposes, it should be rioted 
that aid in Asia, more specifically South Korea and Taiwan (which both received 
approximately $6 billion between 1946 and 1978)56 has been essential to development. 
Foreign aid in this instance came in the form of military and economic aid from the 
United States.
On this note the literature can tentatively be divided into two camps, those that 
believe aid is effective, and those that believe aid is not effective due to other mitigating 
factors. Mitigating factors could include an overflow of aid, which above certain levels 
starts to have negative effects. Milton Friedman maintains that economic aid does more 
harm than good, he objected in particular to the notion that development requires 
government planning. To him, what ‘developing’ countries need is not copious amounts 
of aid, but an effective work force in a favourable economic situation, without a
54 Uma Lele, Rahul Jain, “Synthesis: Aid to African Agriculture,” in Lele ed. Aid to African
Agriculture: Lessons from two Decades o f Donor Experience. (Washington: World Bank, 1989), 
236.
55 Uma Lele, Rahul Jain, 236.
56 Mason, 435.
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favourable economic climate aid will “almost surely retard economic growth.”57 Peter 
Bauer has persistently argued that aid given directly to the government leads to the 
politicization of life, which in his opinion has very negative consequences, for example 
the southern African nation of Zimbabwe where food aid given to the government was 
distributed primarily to supporters of the ruling party ZANU PF. Keith Griffin supports 
the view held by Bauer by using an econometric analysis focusing on savings and the 
productivity of aid financed investment, in which he concludes that aid can technically 
harm growth.58
One way in which the Bank focuses on effectiveness is in terms of poverty 
reduction. On the other hand, other authors use different variables to measure 
effectiveness, from debt relief, democratization levels to aid dependency. Traditionally 
the effect of aid is measured by the coefficient of aid/Gross Domestic Product (GDP); 
however some of the complications of this method are noted in a Ryerson University 
Conference paper which states that this coefficient measures only the direct effects and 
tends to ignore the indirect effects.59 This introduces us to the notion of aid fimgibility 
which is discussed later on in the paper. Whereas Griffin and McKinley, citing recent 
studies, argue that there is no relationship between aid and growth (in this case assuming 
that effectiveness is reflected in economic growth).
It is important to note that “any attempt to assess the effectiveness of 
developmental assistance, in particular that of a single institution such as the World
57 Milton Friedman, “Foreign Economic Aid: means and objectives” reprinted in Jagdish Bhagwati and
Richard Eckaus, (1970): 64.
58 Robert Lensik and Harry White. “Are There Negative Returns to Aid?” 11 Nov, 2003. Online. Available
from http://www.ub.rug.n1/eldoc/som/e/99E60/99e60.pdf. 3.
59 Ryerson University. “Regime Changes, Economic Policies, and the effects o f  Aid on Growth.” 11 Nov,
2003. Online. Available from http://www.rverson.ca/econ/ConferencePapers/PoliticalStabilitv.pdf. 
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Bank, confronts inherent analytical difficulties. The complexity of social and economic 
change means that the impact of aid cannot be separated”60 from other factors. As the 
literature will show, effective development essentially requires country ownership; as a 
result outside actors (bilateral or multilateral aid agencies) are unlikely to be the primary 
initiators of development.61 Therefore, where these outside actors are central to the 
process of reform, the future sustainability of the reform may be in doubt. Even where 
these external actors are clearly important, they will be more effective working with local 
government or some other internal institution. Therefore this makes it extremely difficult 
to assess blame or credit to any institution or individual, and this stresses the need for 
enhanced coordination between respective parties.
The most authoritative and conclusive summary, to date, of World Bank aid 
effectiveness is the Bank’s own 1998 summary, ‘Assessing Aid: What Works, What 
doesn ’t and Why.’ This body of literature is the most conclusive because it falls back on 
the Banks’ own experience with developmental issues, examining why certain policies 
worked and why others failed. The general conclusions in this summary are based on 
detailed studies using internal Bank assessments of loans, these assessments were 
undertaken by the OED, using econometric analyses of the relationship between aid and 
growth. The various conclusions are stated throughout the proceeding literature review. 
As the blue-print for assessing aid, the frame work of this review will critically 
disseminate information from ‘Assessing Aid' and outline the major theoretical arguments 
put forward by the Bank, and contrast this with the view points of other respected 
independent academics on aid effectiveness.
60 World Bank, 21.
61 Halsey Rogers, “Role and Effectiveness o f  Development Assistance: Lessons from the World Bank
Experience,” World Bank Working Paper. (2002): 29.
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The Bank outlines two key requirements in relation to the effectiveness of aid. 
Effective aid requires the right timing and the right combination of capital and ideas. 
Simply giving financial assistance to a country will not ensure effectiveness. It could, 
depending on the amounts of aid lead to negative effects. Halsey Rogers notes that 
“developmental assistance also includes analysis, advice and capacity building,” it is 
often the degree of implementation of these non-lending tools of development that 
determines the effectiveness of the project or policy.63 The timing of assistance is crucial 
when helping countries address some of the problems inherent in their economies. Indeed 
David Dollar and Paul Collier take this further by adding that the presence of large scale 
poverty prior to the Bank’s intervention will almost always increase the effectiveness of 
aid.64 Significantly increased country selectivity, due to the knowledge accumulated by 
the Bank, has over the years led to a dramatic increase in the effectiveness of aid as 
evaluated and noted by the OED.
The current President of the World Bank, James D. Wolfensohn also believes that 
for a developmental project to succeed, local governments must have ownership. In his 
Comprehensive Developmental Framework outlined in 1999, he argues that 
developmental programs must be country owned, not owned by specific donors or the 
World Bank.65 This is one of the fundamental areas in which all of the noted theorists on 




64 Paul Collier and David Dollar, “Developmental Effectiveness: What Have We Learnt?” World Bank
Working Paper. (20011: 11.
65 Shantayanan Devarajan, David Dollar and Torgny Holmgren, Aid & Reform in Africa (Washington DC:
Library o f  Congress, 2001), xi.
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Michelle Adams points to the glaring need for the involvement of beneficiaries in
project implementation.66 This is crucial because for projects or policies to be considered
effective, they must, according to the World Development Report 2000/20001, foster
ownership by the people for whom the policy or project is ostensibly being
implemented.67 Another major component of Wolfensohn’s developmental framework is
the notion of good governance. To him, good macroeconomic policies cannot be
implemented if the government is ineffective or corrupt.68
James Wolfensohn makes a valid point when citing the need for ‘project
ownership.’ When local governments or other such actors on the economy ‘own’
projects, it takes away the threat of projects being labelled as forms of neo-colonialism.
For example, the southern African nation of Zambia having strong historical ties to the
British Empire, would ideally like to perceive that following independence they are
‘charting their own destiny’ so to speak; they would be doing this by owning or having a
say in developmental projects.
Killick provides a general definition of ‘ownership’ in the context of reform:
Government ownership is at its strongest when the political leadership and its advisers, 
with broad support among agencies o f state and civil society, decide of their own volition 
that policy changes are desirable, choose what these changes should be and when they 
should be introduced, and where these changes become built into parameters o f policy 
and administration which are generally accepted as desirable.69
As previously mentioned this definition can be contrasted with a situation in
which reforms are donor initiated and have little domestic support from either local
government or civil society. In which case, the reforms are not likely to succeed: Isham,
66 Michelle Miller-Adams, The World Bank: New Agendas in a Changing World (New York: Routledge
Publishing, 1999), 143.
67 World Bank, World Development Report 2000/2001 (Washington DC: World Bank, 2001), 193.
68 James Wolfensohn, Creating an International Development Framework (Washington DC: World Bank,
1999), 3.
69 Tony Killick, Aid and the Political Economy o f Policy Change (New York: Routledge, 1998), 76.
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Kaufmann, and Pritchett attest to this by noting that in distorted environments, where 
governments are characterised by corruption, poor property rights and macroeconomic 
instability, development projects promoted by donors tend to fail.70
How strongly a country believes that a project or policy will bring benefits affects 
the overall amount of effort put into it and the amount of resources made available by 
local government. This ties in with the notion that domestic policy often affects aid 
effectiveness more so than any other factor: determinants of aid effectiveness if need be 
can be broken down exclusively to factors within the recipient country. The World 
Development Report 2000/2001 cites a major study on the relationship between donors 
and African recipients. The study found that despite some improvements, donors have a 
propensity to dictate the project cycle and pay insufficient attention to the preferences of
7 1the government or project beneficiaries.
Shantayanan Devarajan, David Dollar and Torgny Holmgren using ten African 
countries (Ghana, Uganda, Ethiopia, Mali, Tanzania, Cote d’Ivoire, Kenya, Zambia, 
Democratic Republic of Congo and Nigeria) as case studies, show that when aid supports 
a country-owned development strategy, it can lead to sustained growth and poverty 
reduction, thus making developmental assistance effective. In the case of Ghana, the 
Economic Reform Program supported by World Bank loans enjoyed high levels of 
Ghanaian ownership (ownership as previously defined by Tony Killick), which translated 
into macroeconomic success, and sustained levels of economic growth. Countries that 
have used aid successfully have had local or partial ownership of reforms. Countries that 
have made less progress typically have either had powerful vested interests blocking the
70 Jonathan Isham, Daniel Kaufmann and Lant Pritchett, “Civil Liberties, Democracy and the Performance
of Government Projects,” World Bank Economic Review 11 (21. (1997), 219-242.
71 World Bank. 193.
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implementation of change or have had inadequate infrastructure to support the 
implementation of selected reforms.
The most generally accepted theory by scholars of aid effectiveness is the notion 
that good policy environments or sound domestic policies create a better atmosphere for 
aid effectiveness. The World Bank notes that the extent of a domestic governments own 
commitment is crucial to determining the impact of reform. Craig Burnside, David 
Dollar, Christopher Gilbert and David Vines concur that to maximise aid effectiveness, 
aid should be directed towards governments where there is already an effective policy 
regime in place. These are countries where, as noted earlier, further reforms are more 
likely to be owned, and are likely to be effectively implemented.72 Burnside and Dollar 
however go further by arguing that foreign aid has a strong positive effect on growth on 
low income countries with good policies and that the effectiveness of aid is not 
measurable in countries with severely distorted policy regimes. Tony Killick reinforces 
their argument by noting that aid transfers have not been effective in promoting growth or 
inducing aid reform, except in good policy environments.74
Tony Killick in his 1991 study of aid effectiveness in Africa notes that indigenous 
policies pursued by local governments play the most important role in determining aid’s 
effectiveness. Ghana’s experience with foreign aid supports this conclusion. Ghana 
underwent significant socio-economic reforms in the mid 1980’s, yet in comparison with 
other African countries at the time Ghana received a relatively small amount of aid, yet
72 Christopher Gilbert and David Vines, The World Bank: Structure and Policies (Cambridge: University
Press, 2000), 28.
73 Craig Burnside and David Dollar, “Aid, the Incentive Regime, and Poverty Reduction,” World Bank
Working Paper. (1998): 2.
74 Killick, 23.
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was considered a ‘successful reformer’ by the Bank. Kruger et al in their 1989 study on
aid and development provide a detailed description of the benefits of a policy framework:
The most important lesson learned about economic development, and
therefore about the role of assistance, is the significance o f the
overall macroeconomic environment for growth. Over the
past thirty years appreciation o f the importance o f appropriate
trade and exchange rate policies, o f fiscal and monetary policies,
and o f the overall incentive structure provided by government
policies has increased continuously... Experience indicates that the
macroeconomic setting is an important determinant of the success
of sectoral and project assistance. In countries where the macroeconomic
framework is appropriate, real rates o f return to investment projects tend to be
high.75
The Bank, upon reviewing its own literature and reflecting on its lending
experiences, in 1998 presented evidence on policy environment and foreign aid. The 
Bank concluded in several studies that there is no “positive relationship between the level 
of aid receipts and the rate of economic growth in general; however there is a positive 
relationship in countries with sound economic management.”76 Directly related to this, is 
the combination of well-targeted aid and sound economic management. Halsey Rogers 
notes that “well targeted aid not only reduces poverty, but also has far wider effects.”77
Unlike the Bank, he notes that “well-designed aid crowds in private investment, both 
domestic and foreign.” 78 As a result, the investment climate in the recipient country 
improves, and the ‘crowding-in’ aspect of investment that he mentioned earlier leads to 
greater returns to aid; more so than simply poverty reduction.
The Bank citing public investment projects financed by them, in such ventures as 
transportation, education and health, comes to conclusions based on the relationship 
between the Bank and recipient countries. In countries with good macroeconomic
75 Killick, 25.
76 World Bank, 200.
77 Rogers, 35.
78 Rogers, 35.
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management and efficient public institutions, “projects were 86 percent successful, with 
much higher rates of return,” however in countries with “weak policies and institutions, 
the corresponding figure is a measly 48 per cent.”79 To support this, comparative studies 
done by the Bank show that aid is more effective in Botswana and Bolivia as opposed to 
Tanzania and Nicaragua, because Botswana and Bolivia have stronger institutions and 
better economic policies.
The World Bank and Burnside and Dollar agree that financial assistance must be 
targeted more effectively to low income countries with sound economic management 
policies. The problem here is that the majority of countries with poor economic 
management policies are likely to be the countries that require the most developmental 
aid. Against this argument, the Bank counters by explaining that aid in this case, can be 
effective in sectoral reform. Sectoral reform is staff intensive and would lead to the staff 
developing methods to test their ideas and reforms. Therefore even in situations where 
policies and institutions are weak, donors have tried to find something useful to finance. 
The Bank also counters by adding that, aid can be effective even in the most distorted 
environments and that in difficult environments effective assistance is more about ideas 
or knowledge accumulation than money or projects.
Theorists differ on the intricate effects of conditionality, but in general there is a 
common perception that conditionality does not promote effective aid. Conditionality can 
be defined as: conditions attached to financial loans, that usually involve the adoption of 
policies designed to lay the foundations for sustainable economic growth. Michel 
Chossudovsky focuses on the negative aspects of policy conditionalities that are normally
79 World Bank, Assessing Aid: What Works. What Doesn’t and Why (Washington DC: Oxford University
Press, 1998), 15.
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attached to loans. The objective of these conditionalities according to Chossudovsky is to 
maintain nations in a “strait-jacket” which prevents them from embarking upon 
independent national policies.80 This point supports the theory of the ‘Conditionality 
Bank’ posited by Gilbert and Vines in which the ability to impose conditionality is 
central to the Bank’s effectiveness.81 The Bank acquires its strength based on its ability to 
package together lending, developmental assistance and research: by lending to approved 
projects, the Bank is able to increase its prospects for debt servicing and repayment. Due 
to the Bank’s vast knowledge resources, it is readily able to address issues of market 
failure and policy risk, which in turn enable the Bank to devise conditions on loans and to 
impose these conditions.
Gilbert and Vines note: “in the absence of Bank conditionality, project returns 
may not be sufficient to induce investment.”82 Therefore the effects of conditionality will 
be to raise the levels of investment returns, in doing so attracting finance to the private 
sector. The Bank as an institution can capture some of the gains from conditionality; in 
doing this the Bank adds value to some of the projects that it lends to. So, conditionality 
if effective, would serve to raise the amount of payments back to the Bank.
The Bank, on the other hand, argues that that the dynamics between aid donors 
and recipients explain why conditionality inevitably fails. The essential problem is that 
the recipient countries do not see the conditions set on the loans as binding, however this 
does not stop the donors from contributing aid. Therefore what tends to happen is that, 
while compliance with conditions tends to be low, the release rate of loans continues to 
be high. This, in extreme cases can lead to increased debt burdens for the recipient
80 Michel Chossudovsky, The Globalisation o f Poverty (New Jersey: Zed Books Ltd, 1997), 51.
81 Gilbert and Vines, 56.
82 Gilbert and Vines, 56.
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countries, as conditions attached to Bank adjustment loans continue to increase. To lead 
us on to the next point, it should be noted that conditionality is unlikely to bring about 
lasting reform if  there is no strong domestic movement for change.
Unlike the Bank, Paul Collier argues that conditionality fails to bring about 
effective policy change; he argues that governments who are not committed to effective 
change have incentives to “renege on commitments,”83 and due to wider political 
economy considerations, donors have no legitimate means of enforcing the sanction of 
not providing aid. Collier suggests in this scenario, for greater effectiveness, aid should 
be provided to countries with good policies, rather than offered as an incentive to bring 
about policy reform; this according to him would ultimately lead to increased 
effectiveness.
The Bank acknowledges throughout the majority of the literature that reforms 
need to focus on creating and transmitting knowledge and capacity. In this situation, 
developmental projects should support initiatives that improve public service delivery. 
The argument here is that local knowledge and institutional capacity are one of the most 
important outputs of development assistance. This will hopefully lead to greater 
empowerment of the people through their participation.
The World Development Report 2000/ 2001 emphasises the importance of donor 
coordination and coherency as a means of increasing aid effectiveness. Coherency 
referring to making all instititions accountable, to a certain extent, to a World Bank 
dominated agenda. When donors cross priorities, this can translate itself on the ground 
and quite often create an unworkable environment for a recipient government. The sheer 
number of donors and donor projects can in itself be challenging. For example, at one
83 Gilbert and Vines, 268.
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point there were 405 donor-funded projects in the Mozambican Ministry of Health alone. 
In Ghana during the same period 64 different government institutions were receiving 
aid.84
In 1999 the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) approved the 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP). This strategy took into consideration the neo­
liberal notions of ownership and donor coordination, and in doing so established a new 
framework for development assistance. Halsey Rogers in his Bank report notes that the 
underlying goals of the PRSP process are to ensure broad based country ownership of 
poverty reduction strategies, focus on results that really matter for the poor and to build 
stronger relationships between low income countries and the donor community.85 Bank 
and IMF representatives meet regularly to discuss ways in which the PRSP’s can be made 
more effective. This open method of dialogue, in the long run, will ultimately serve the 
developing world as these multilateral institutions gradually improve their methods of 
impact analysis.
A key concept of development aid discussed by the Bank, Collier, Burnside and 
Killick is that of fungibility. Suppose an aid donor gives money to build a primary school 
in a poor country. If the recipient government would have built the school anyway, then 
the consequence of the aid is to release resources for the government to spend on other 
items.86 This by definition is aid fungibility. Aid fungibility has had profound 
implications for measuring aid effectiveness. Project specific evaluations have not 
reflected the true impact of aid effectiveness. Since aid is likely ‘freeing up’ government 
resources for other activities, there is no way of measuring the final impact.
84 World Bank, World Development Report 2000/2001 (Washington DC: World Bank, 2001), 193.
85 Rogers, 43.
86 Gilbert and Vines, 211.
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Devarajan and Swaroop note: “a donor project may actually have a very high rate 
of economic return, but at the margin it could be financing something very different, even 
undesirable expenditures.”87 The alternative view to this is supported by Stephen Jones 
who stresses that the Bank should recognise fungibility and lend to governments of
countries where developmental returns are generally high, rather than focusing on
88narrowly defined project returns. In essence, fungibility becomes a problem only when 
the objectives of donor and recipient differ. If aid is not fungible, evaluating the overall 
effect of aid according to the Bank is easy. The effect is simply the collective effort of 
individual projects undertaken in different sectors of the economy. For example, if health 
care reform is important, more projects in that area should lead to greater improvements 
in this area.
In the Bank’s 1998 study on aid, the implications of fungibility for evaluating 
projects are discussed. One theory put forward is that donor financing of projects raises 
government spending exactly as if it were part of the budgetary plan. This implies that, 
even as the Bank is financing projects, an assessment of aid’s effect as a financial transfer 
depends on a judgement of overall government spending.89 This would ultimately involve 
assessing the rationale for government spending. This goes back to the Bank’s insistence 
for good policy environments, in the sense that in countries with good policies donors can 
provide large amounts of assistance as budgetary support, knowing the resources will be 
well used. If aid is indeed fungible, then measuring its effectiveness creates both short 
and long term problems: short term results of say an aid financed health project would be
87 Gilbert and Vines, 207.
88 Gilbert and Vines, 266.
89 World Bank, Assessing Aid: What Works. What Doesn’t and Why (Washington DC: Oxford University
Press, 1998), 60.
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more visible than the long term results. The immediate results are “visible:” for example 
the ‘big, shiny new hospital’ however the long term effect of say a decline in infant 
mortality is not immediately recognised. The question that needs to be asked here is what 
are the implications of this for measuring effectiveness? One obvious consequence of 
this is that effectiveness has to be measured over time: in doing so aid effectiveness 
would recognise fungibility as a viable component of effectiveness.
Buckley stresses the importance of institutional factors in aid effectiveness. By 
focusing on the role of institutional performance, particularly in light of the Asian crisis, 
Buckley comes to several conclusions. World Bank projects are almost twice as likely to 
fail in low income countries with low institutional quality and that strong institutions 
more than double the likelihood that a country undergoing adjustment can sustain policy 
reform.90 Conversely, he also reports that Bank initiatives aimed at improving 
institutional capacity through civil service reform, have been among the weakest 
performing areas of the Banks portfolio.
The Bank’s own study on institutional capacity focuses on the composition and 
quality of public expenditure as a key determinant of aid effectiveness. Success, with 
regards to institutional capacity can be measured on two different levels. On a micro 
level, success can be measured by examining specific projects or policies, whereas on a 
macro level success can be measured by examining economy wide growth and poverty 
reduction. The Banks analysis 'Assessing Aid: What Works, What doesn’t and Why’ notes 
that when donor projects fail, it is often because of weak institutions and public 
organizations: there is plenty of evidence that institutional capability affects overall
90 R. Buckley, 1998 Annual Review o f Development Effectiveness (Washington DC: World Bank, 1999),
4.
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economic growth and the success of investments. For example, one recent study found 
that “over the 30 years to 1994, countries with sound policies and capable and effective 
government institutions grew at 3 percent per capita each year -  while those with sound 
policies but weak institutions grew at only 1.4 percent a year.”91
One obvious way of determining effectiveness is to ask the simple question, what 
would have happened in the absence of aid? Case study analysis presented by the 
majority of scholars92 show that the absence of donor financing would have had adverse 
effects on the recipients’ nations. Without the assistance of structural adjustment 
programs, which were financed by the Bank, Kenya’s economic growth between 1985 
and 1990 would not have been as great (using gross domestic product as a 
measurement).93 Essentially this shows that evaluating projects’ effectiveness requires 
not just a thorough examination of what is going on the ground, but judging what would 
have happened had there been no aid at all.
Paul Collier considers three dominant debates on the effectiveness of aid that 
centre around the relationship between donor agencies and recipient governments. Collier 
examines conditionality, and concludes that conditionality can be seen as ineffective. In 
the second debate, he examines the notion that aid dependency is undermining national 
capacities of recipient nations. The third debate is around the suggestion that 
developmental aid, by focusing on individual nations, has missed its comparative 
advantage94 in the financing of coordinated development schemes. To this effect, Collier
91 World Bank, Assessing Aid: What Works. What Doesn’t and Why (Washington DC: Oxford University
Press, 1998), 89.
92 Dollar, Holmgren, Devarajan and Collier.
93 Devarajan, Dollar and Holmgren, 510.
94 When one nation’s opportunity cost o f producing an item is less than another nations opportunity cost o f
producing that item.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
43
suggests that aid can act as a catalyst for regional cooperation, and in doing so promote 
development.
Stephen Knack found that in general there is no concrete relationship between 
foreign aid and democracy, however he does note that foreign aid can “potentially 
contribute towards democratization in several ways: through technical assistance i.e. 
focusing on the electoral process, through conditionality and by improving education, 
which research shows is conducive to democratization.”95 Therefore the tensions that 
exist between the two notions of ‘development and democracy’ are played out through 
international institutions like the World Bank and IMF, and it can be firmly concluded 
that there is some type of relationship between foreign aid and levels of democratization, 
the strength of the relationship is what is relevant.
The literature clearly shows that the effectiveness of the Bank varies depending 
on the specific scenario and economic climate. The selection of Lesotho for this study is 
designed to focus on a southern African country which has been significantly neglected 
in developmental discourse. According to the literature ownership of projects and sound 
domestic policy are essential for project effectiveness. Countless research findings attest 
to the positive effects of ownership and sound policy, not only World Bank studies but 
studies conducted by other multilateral and bilateral institutions, although these studies 
are not directed primarily at establishing effectiveness of aid.
With regards to aid effectiveness the literature concludes that aid is very effective, 
but only under the right conditions: because even critics of aid like Friedman 
acknowledge that certain types of aid are effective. For him, it was military aid. And
95 Stephen Knack, “Does Foreign Aid Promote Democracy,” World Bank Working Paper no. 238. (2000):
2 .
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while Bauer argues that aid leads to the politicization of life, he does not make the 
distinction between types of aid. Developmental aid does not necessarily have to go 
through governments, it can go through non-governmental organizations, and in this way 
be very effective.
One fundamental issue that emerges out of the literature review is that of 
sustainability. There is no point in having ‘project ownership’ and ‘a good policy 
environment’ if changes implemented cannot be sustained. Better policies, good resource 
allocation and strategic implementation are all rendered irrelevant if long-term 
sustainability cannot be achieved. The task then becomes ensuring that sustainability be a 
focal point of future developmental policy formations with regards to foreign aid.
After going through the majority of the literature on aid effectiveness, it is safe to 
conclude that the methodological approaches taken in the majority of the literature on aid 
effectiveness tend to be more quantitative than qualitative in nature. Although 
quantitative studies are very useful, qualitative research inevitably provides accurate 
information that can be used to fully understand the extent of the problem: in this case 
how to make aid more effective. World Bank professionals (the policy makers) and those 
on the ground would benefit greatly from detail-oriented qualitative research.
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III. METHODOLOGY
Several factors were taken into consideration when determining which country was to be 
used as a case study for this analysis. While most studies focusing on southern Africa 
would look to either incorporate or focus on South Africa, primarily because South 
Africa post-apartheid has a lot more relevance to the international community, this study 
chose to focus on Lesotho. The selection of Lesotho might at first seem odd, but there are 
reasons for the selection. Firstly, apart from the literature contributed by the dominant 
International Financial Institutions, there is a distinct lack of academic literature on 
Lesotho’s developmental challenges. Secondly, Lesotho is located in sub-Saharan Africa, 
which historically is the most impoverished region in the world; and thirdly 
manageability, Lesotho is a small country and information is easily accessible, and the 
researcher is fluent in the local dialect Sesotho. All the factors above combined to make 
the choice of Lesotho fairly simple, and the idea that this study would inevitably 
contribute to an on-going process of academia further strengthened the country rationale.
In terms of project rationale, the 1995 PRP was chosen after comparing various 
other projects in terms of scale and perceived influence of the project. It was then decided 
that the PRP was the obvious choice because of its large scale focus on the health sector, 
while other projects have focused on the health sector, none can match the scale of the 
1995 PRP. Data regarding the 1995 PRP was also readily available, making it the most 
reasonable choice in terms of project selection/ rationale.
Learning from failure and understanding the sources of success, to an institution 
like the World Bank is imperative: because this is ultimately the way forward. As 
previously noted, the fundamental purpose of this study is to provide contemporary
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information on the effectiveness of the Bank’s activities in Lesotho, within the context of 
the health care system as it relates to the 1995 Poverty Reduction Action Plan. While 
there has been a substantial amount of data outlining the projects and policies of the 
Bank, there is a distinct lack of follow up, project specific data, particularly in the context 
of southern Africa. This said, there are however impact evaluation assessments, notably 
through the Bank’s Operations Evaluation Department (OED).96 These assessments 
demand a substantial amount of information, time and resources and therefore tend to be 
carried out on a regional or country specific basis and very rarely on a project specific 
basis.
Given the Bank’s sharpened push towards poverty reduction, any well researched 
analysis of the Bank, focusing on the effectiveness of developmental aid would be useful. 
In particular it would be useful to Bank staff members and the greater international 
development academia, who devise and implement projects throughout the world. 
Especially since poverty reduction is increasingly being associated with economic 
growth, which, in the ‘developing’ world is traditionally achieved through developmental 
aid. This study coincides with the Millennium Developmental Goals, which essentially 
place the emphasis on eradicating extreme poverty through the development of local 
infrastructure (infrastructure in this case being investment in human resources). This 
focus on infrastructure relates well with the theoretical aspects of this study, which argue 
that good infrastructure leads to greater aid effectiveness. It will also be interesting to see 
the extent to which Lesotho followed the policies recommended by the Bank’s 1995
96 OED is an independent unit within the World Bank that reports directly to the Bank’s directors: the OED 
is an evaluation unit, designed to assess the effectiveness o f the Bank’s work.
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poverty assessment, specifically focusing public expenditure on human resource 
investments.
In order to rationalize the final methodology chosen for this study, it is essential 
to briefly outline the various types of methodology available for a study of this nature. 
Some of the more common methodologies used by the Bank to assess effectiveness of aid 
operations can be found in the Bank’s recently prepared handbook: 1 Evaluating the 
Impact ofDevelopment Projects on Poverty: A Handbook for Practitioners. ’ Judy Baker 
notes that “regardless of the project type or questions being addressed, the design of each 
impact evaluation will be unique, depending on factors such as the type of data available, 
local capacity and timing and budget concerns.”97 Every Bank project is different or has a 
different set of circumstances to deal with; there can be no homogenous method of 
evaluating effectiveness: particularly project/ policy oriented effectiveness over an 
extended period of time. Baker notes that there are several techniques for impact 
evaluation: experimental designs, quasi experimental designs, qualitative methods, cost- 
effectiveness analysis and theory based analysis. She also notes that stronger 
methodologies often combine methods, which often lead to more conclusive results. The 
following is a brief summary of the advantages and disadvantages of each methodology 
as noted by Judy Baker.
Experimental and quasi-experimental techniques for evaluating project impact are 
quantitative in nature. Experimental designs are considered to be the most effective 
method of evaluation. This method focuses on “comparable treatment and control groups
97 Judy Baker, Evaluating the Impact o f  Development Projects on Poverty: A Handbook for Practitioners
(Washington D.C: World Bank, 2000), vii.
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that are statistically equivalent to one another, given well defined sample sizes.”98 The 
main benefit of this technique is its simplicity in interpreting results. The main criticism, 
she notes, is that these designs are often considered biased due to the denial of benefits to 
otherwise eligible members for the purposes of the study.
According to Baker “quasi-experimental designs can be used to carry out an 
evaluation when it is not possible to construct treatment groups through experimental 
design. In other words one tries to pick an ideal comparison that matches the treatment 
group from a larger survey.”99 The main benefit of these designs is that they draw on 
existing data sources and are therefore often easier and quicker to implement. The 
principal disadvantage of the quasi-experimental methodology is that of selection bias.100
Qualitative techniques “focus on understanding processes, behaviours and 
conditions as they are perceived by the individuals or groups being studied.”101 
Qualitative methods are often used in situations where “participant observation can 
provide insight into the ways in which households and local communities perceive how a
107project is affecting them.” The benefits of qualitative methods are, primarily that they 
are flexible, and can be specifically tailored to the particular study using open ended 
questions. The primary disadvantages are the “subjectivity involved in data collection, 
the lack of a comparison group and the lack of statistical robustness,”103 assuming 
statistics are a necessary part of the research.
Baker, 6.
w Baker, 7.
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Cost benefit analysis enables policy makers to measure program efficiency by 
measuring economic efficiency of a programme against the program benefits. Whereas 
theory based evaluations are based on theories as to whether or not the particular project 
will work: each theory along with its assumptions would be assessed during 
implementation of the project. Both of these methods, though useful, are only feasible at 
certain times during a project: cost benefit analyses are normally implemented at the end 
of a project, and theory based evaluations at the beginning of a project.
In light of Judy Baker’s techniques for measuring project effectiveness, this study 
intends to do a qualitative assessment to measure the long term effectiveness of the 1995 
Poverty Reduction Action Plan. Qualitative assessment has been chosen for several 
reasons. Qualitative research in this context focuses on an expected outcome, and the 
methods available through qualitative research are the most conclusive in the sense that 
various sources are consulted in the research process. Also qualitative methods are fairly 
open ended, and, if need be, the data gathered in the study can be quantified.
For this study, the best way to gauge the long term effectiveness of aid in the 
health sector would be to get reactions from individuals themselves, namely doctors, 
hospital administrators and other such health care professionals. It would also be 
necessary to carefully dissect the criteria put forward by the Bank, to determine whether 
or not their set goals were achieved ‘on the ground’ in the allotted time period. The idea 
here is to contrast the different approaches and lenses used to examine the same 
“problem.” The 1995 Poverty Reduction Plan, as in most policies implemented by IFI’s 
takes a very top-down approach to poverty reduction through health, whereas this study
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proposes to approach the same issues from the bottom up to highlight the differences, if 
in fact there are any between the two methods.
Given the reliance on interviews for this study, it is crucial that the ‘right’ people 
be interviewed. Not only will those with specific knowledge of the Bank’s activities in 
Lesotho be interviewed, but also those with knowledge on the effectiveness of aid in the 
health sector. Therefore interviews will be the primary mode of research for this study. 
Whether the interviews conducted are elite interviews with government officials or focus 
groups carried out amongst the local people affected by the Bank’s projects, these 
interviews would inherently provide insight on how the people feel with regards to 
effectiveness of the aid provided by the Bank. Interviews would allow for reliable data 
quality, and would minimise biased conclusions, the idea being that focus groups and 
elite interviews would provide more balanced results. Maximising the validity of the 
information that is provided ensures that the overall methodology is fairly simple. 
Simplicity in turn, hopefully leads to conclusive results.
For this study, the results of the interviews were consolidated and compared with 
the goals stated in the 1995 PRP and a conclusion was reached with regards to the 
effectiveness of the Banks foreign aid. However, the conclusions reached in this 
particular study cannot be generalized to the effectiveness of foreign aid on a global 
scale. The literature review clearly illustrates that the Bank’s numerous projects 
worldwide are unique with regards to circumstance and desired results. This research, on 
a micro level, will solely highlight the situation of the Bank in Lesotho, and draw 
conclusions on research done in and for the benefit of Lesotho, and the World Bank in 
Lesotho.
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INTERVIEW SAMPLE QUESTIONS
The following framework of questions were selectively posed to those chosen for the 
interview process:
1. Are you aware of any projects or policies implemented by the World Bank to improve 
the health sector over the last ten years?
2. Of the policies mentioned what were the most prominent projects/ policies during this 
period?
3. Are you aware that discussions between the government of Lesotho and the World 
Bank led to the formulation of policy designed, in part to invest in the health sector in the 
1995 PRP?
4. In your own opinion what has contributed to the challenges faced by the World Bank 
(if in fact there were any) in implementing its projects/ policies?
5. And how do you think you can correct these problems?
6. Have the indicators of ‘well-being’ improved, decreased or stayed the same during this 
period?
7. What is the average life expectancy in Lesotho?
8. What is the leading cause of death for adults in Lesotho?
9. Is there a good working relationship between those implementing the desired goals (i.e. 
doctors) and the administrators (i.e. government)?
10. Do health professionals have any input into projects that may be planned by the 
government in consultation with the World Bank, or is it merely imposed from above?
11. Are children under five exempt from health fees?
12. Is there free basic health coverage in Lesotho?
13 . If the answer is no: In your opinion is free health coverage a realistic goal? If the 
answer is yes: how has this been successfully implemented?
14. Is there geographic equity in hospitals/ clinics throughout Lesotho?
15. Do local clinics retain the income that they receive?
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IV. OVERVIEW OF HEALTH SECTOR
The literature on the health sector in Lesotho is fairly limited, the most prominent voice 
in the matter is the Lesotho Health Sector Reform Plan produced by the Ministry of 
Health and Social Welfare in 2000. This report provides contemporary and historical 
information with regards to the status and development of the health sector. The report 
focuses primarily on health initiatives implemented by the Lesotho government post­
independence. Although the government report focuses on the domestic issues plaguing 
the health sector, it gives significant insight and crucial background information with 
regards to policy and project success/ failure that the government, independent of other 
local and international actors has endured over the years. With this in mind, this section 
seeks to provide a brief summary of the World Banks health care promotional activities, 
give a brief historical outline of the health sector in Lesotho highlighting key policies 
implemented by the government and lastly provide an outline of the 1995 Poverty 
Reduction Action Plan.
The World Bank has increasingly been active in facilitating health reform in the 
developing world. A significant portion of the Millennium Developmental Goals has 
contributed to making health care priorities an increased part of the general Country 
Assessment Strategies. Globally, the Bank is the “largest external funder of health care 
programmes, with new commitments of $1.3 billion a year for health, nutrition and 
population projects.”104 In general, these sectoral projects have enjoyed relative success 
throughout the developing world, particularly in human development indicators, i.e. life 
expectancy and child mortality.
104 Rogers, 49.
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An example of this can be seen in central Africa: in Mali the Bank’s project 
lending contributed to the increase in children being vaccinated against tetanus (this rose 
from 18% to 50%).105 “Through its support to policy reform, technical assistance, and 
financing, the Bank has helped expand geographical access to basic health services, 
sponsored valuable training for service providers, and contributed advice and other 
important inputs to government basic health services.”106 More significantly; however, 
particularly for southern Africa, has been the Bank’s push to stem the HIV epidemic. Aid 
for HIV since the late eighties is close $1.5 billion, with the majority of this aid coming 
post 1998.107
The first health related facilities established in Lesotho were established during 
the colonial era by the British. The British set up these facilities almost exclusively 
around the urban settlements, and in doing so, completely neglected the rural out-posts of 
Lesotho. It was in fact the churches that established other health services around the 
country. However since the churches relied solely on patient fees for their maintenance, 
they were not able to provide a wide range of services. ‘Church clinics’ in effect 
dominated the landscape of pre-independent Lesotho; however post-independence 
different medical facilities emerged.
The Ministry of Health and Social Welfare is responsible for providing health 
services in Lesotho. In Lesotho the health care system is made up of a hierarchy of 
different institutions. There are currently four types of medical facility with differing 
levels of staff training and resources. The smallest unit of health care is visible at the 
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trained to deal with minor treatments and not with the more complex medical procedures. 
These medical centres also function as satellites for the regional health centres. The next 
level up, are clinics or health centres: these clinics are managed by nurses and therefore 
the skilled labour in terms of training is that of a nurse. The next level up one has 
eighteen hospitals serving specific regions including Queen Elizabeth II Hospital which 
also serves as a district hospital. Associated with Queen Elizabeth II Hospital are Filter 
Clinics, which to a certain extent seek to offload Queen Elizabeth II Hospital of its 
district function by providing outpatient care where necessary.
From an historical perspective the health sector in Lesotho can be characterized 
by the fact that throughout the years following independence, the government, as any 
well functioning government would, has continually attempted to introduce new 
initiatives in an attempt to improve the general health status of the Basotho people. These 
initiatives have had varying degrees of success. However the successes have been very 
limited due, partly, to the fact that they were reactive as opposed to being proactive.108 
By reactive, one refers to the fact that the majority of the policies initiated have been a 
response to whatever ‘crisis’ dominates at the time. Whereas proactive refers to 
essentially being aware of a problem and dealing with it accordingly before it becomes 
serious: in other words the notion of controlling a ‘crisis’ before it arises.
Hand in hand with reactive measures came the notion of ‘top-down’ initiatives 
which are not only donor driven but donor dependent. The reference to ‘top-down’ 
suggests that the donors implemented (primarily through funding) the majority of the 
measures that were used. The Ministry of Health and Social Welfare (MOHSW) in their
108 Ministry o f Health and Social Welfare, Lesotho Health Sector Reforms Plan. (Maseru, Ministry o f  
Health and Social Welfare, 2000), 4.
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forementioned report on health conclude that “the effect of this [top down initiatives] is 
that, once donors withdraw their support to a given project or programme, the 
sustainability thereof becomes severely compromised.”109
The first initial attempt to initiate reform in the health sector came in 1979 with 
the adoption of the Primary Health Care (PHC) strategy for the delivery of services, part 
of the PHC strategy was the social objective of “Health For All by the Year 2000 (HFA- 
2000).” At around the same time, the World Bank implemented its first major health 
project in Lesotho, the Population and Health project (1985- 1992). The HFA-2000 set up 
several targets with regards to the delivery of health services: a decentralization policy, 
the introduction of a multi-sectoral approach to the provision of health services, a Health 
Service Area Strategy (HSA), the introduction of the Nurse Clinician Cadre, the 
introduction of the Community Health Worker Programme and the District Management 
Improvement Project (DMI).110 This policy can effectively be considered the first in a 
series o f ‘formal’ attempts to reform the health sector. A brief summary of each target is 
necessary to understand the scale, scope and significance of this strategy.
The decentralization policy implemented was at the time meant to do two things: 
decentralize functions such as planning and budgeting, which historically were performed 
by and exclusive to central levels of government, and promote community awareness in 
matters related to their own health and social welfare. This policy however was 
unsuccessful. The multi-sectoral approach to the provision of health services was 
designed to make use of the advances being made in other sectors i.e. road constructions
109 Ministry o f  Health and Social Welfare, Lesotho Health Sector Reforms Plan. (Maseru, Ministry of
Health and Social Welfare, 2000), 4.
110 Ministry o f  Health and Social Welfare, 6.
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and the rural water supply programme to facilitate access, especially on the periphery, to 
health services.
The HSA was designed to restructure Lesotho around eighteen Health Service 
Areas. Part of the reason behind this was to entrench the decentralization policy, 
therefore making administration that much easier, in the sense that each area would have 
“ownership” over its health centre. The Nurse Clinician Cadre was implemented to 
address the issue of personnel and “the lack of capacity within the nursing cadre to 
implement and manage PHC.”111 Under this strategy the nurses were expected to act as 
equivalents to doctors, in the sense that they could diagnose diseases and prescribe 
certain medicinal drugs.
The Community Health Worker Programme was a part of the multi-sectoral 
approach to health care, and was designed to facilitate interaction between village level 
workers of other ministries i.e. education and agriculture. The District Management 
Improvement Project was introduced to “improve the managerial capacity of the ministry.
i |  ^
It was directed particularly at management structures at HSA level.”
In the years following the implementation of the PHC as the major strategy for 
health services, relative gains were achieved in each of the sub-sectors. Notably, the 
nursing cadre was strengthened substantially in the early 1980’s, with the establishment 
of the Nurse Clinician cadre. This in essence raised the overall number of active nurses in 
the field, particularly in the rural areas. However, more recently there has been a 
significant amount of disinterest shown by the majority of nurses to pursue this career 
path, which leads us to an issue that will become more relevant as the chapter unfolds,
111 Ministry o f Health and Social Welfare, 6.
112 Ministry o f  Health and Social Welfare, 6.
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namely that of sustainability. The Community Health Worker Programme has also 
enjoyed relative gains, to date, the programme has succeeded in training approximately 
six thousand community health workers113, although, as the Lesotho Health Sector 
Reform Plan notes, there needs to be an assessment taken to determine exactly how many 
of these community health workers are active in their respective communities, again 
bringing us back to the notion on sustainability. The Bank, through the PHC also funded 
filter clinics (via the 2nd Population, Health & Nutrition Project PHN-II).114
The improvements noted under the PHC, before the 1995 PRP came into play 
have predominantly been short-term modest gains. Although a lot of progress was made, 
time soon eroded any gains made by the health sector. The difficulty became sustaining 
the resources, both financial and human, needed to maintain the PHC at required levels. 
This combined with the dual administrative health system in Lesotho which pitted the 
MOHSW against the Christian Health Association of Lesotho (CHAL), led to 
“fragmented and uncoordinated delivery of health services.”115 Lastly the persistently 
high population growth rate combined with an unclear policy framework put a huge 
strain on the health system, thus resulting in a serious erosion of gains.
The 1995 Round Table Conference, the last major conference before the 
emergence of the 1995 PRP identified several constraints to the health system iin Lesotho. 
Some of these constraints mentioned include: absorptive capacity constraints, the 
centralization of the decision-making process and shortage of resources. It is under these 
conditions that the formulation of the 1995 PRP was to materialise. Hence the importance
113 Ministry o f Health and Social Welfare, 6.
114 Filter clinics will be defined in greater detail in the up-coming pages.
115 Ministry o f Health and Social Welfare, 9.
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given to investing in human resources, to tackle this lack of staff/ training and other such 
human resources.
The underlying problem with the PHC is not the theory or practicality of the 
strategy. The main problem facing the PHC and indeed the health sector in Lesotho is 
that of sustainability. To bring the PHC to the contemporary socio-economic climate in 
Lesotho: the relentless problems that face the health sector in Lesotho, those of staff and 
equipment shortages and inadequate infrastructure (the extent of these particular 
problems will be discussed in greater details in the next chapter), adversely affect the 
assurance of sustainability with regards to the implementation of the PHC as the main 
driving force behind health reform in Lesotho. More recently with the advent of the HIV/ 
Aids pandemic, there have been increasing calls to reform the health care system in 
Lesotho.
In fact the primary conclusions of the Lesotho Health Sector Reform Plan are that
the health sector in Lesotho has not been able to fulfill its obligations.
By all accounts the health sector in Lesotho has not been able to 
fully fulfil the obligation that it has to the people o f Lesotho. The 
country is still heavily burdened with high rates of morbidity and 
mortality. Personnel currently employed within the system, are not 
only inadequate, but are de-moralized and highly de-motivated. At 
the same time a significant proportion o f health facilities in the 
country, are in appalling states o f disrepair. There are also chronic 
shortages o f drugs and other medical supplies.116
In light of the attempts made by the government through the PHC, it is also 
crucial to know that other attempts have been made to reform the health sector notably 
through the 1995 Poverty Reduction Action Plans’ investment in health care through 
human resources, which is the main focus of this study.
116 Ministry o f  Health and Social Welfare, 4.
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The 1995 PRP in part was a response to the 1994 Country Assessment Strategy 
(CAS): the CAS took into account the Lesotho governments’ vision for its developmental 
trajectory. The 1994 CAS according to Bank details was a three pronged strategy for 
growth aimed primarily to help the government of Lesotho to “maintain and deepen 
macroeconomic and structural reforms,” to “improve capacity to implement the 
programme” and to “capture the benefits of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project 
(LHWP).”117 Basically what the 1994 CAS did was recognize the serious poverty 
situation that Lesotho was in, attribute this to the lack of growth in the private sector and 
concluded that prominent sectors of the economy like health needed more immediate 
assistance.
By all means and purposes, the Bank admits that the 1994 CAS was moderately 
successful in fulfilling its goals. The most successful aspect of the strategy being the 
LHWP: the Bank supported LHWP helped Lesotho generate a considerable amount of 
growth. The educational sector also enjoyed significant successes through the CAS 
whereas no significant progress was made in the health sector. So essentially, the 1994 
CAS defined the parameters in which the 1995 PRP would formulate itself.
Before delving in to the 1995 PRP it must be noted that in Lesotho there are very 
few external players who support (financially) the MOHSW. The donors that do exist 
(UNFPA, WHO, UNICEF) participate primarily in coordination and implementation, but 
as stated in the introduction only Irish Aid, AfDB and the World Bank actually provide 
direct financial support to the health sector. “The support from the other partners is
117 Hassan, 13.
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focused on specific sub-sector programs e.g. UNICEF supports immunization,”118 while 
the Bank focuses on providing financial along with technical guidance.
118 Project Information Document (PID), Report No. AB 2777
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1995 POVERTY REDUCTION ACTION PLAN
The 1995 PRP exemplifies on a smaller scale the World Bank’s approach to poverty 
reduction during the 1990’s. Not only was there great emphasis on investing in human 
resources, there was also the need for private sector development, the commonly held 
perception was that private sector development would foster labour intensive growth, and 
that this could ideally be done through the agriculture and the manufacturing industries. 
This is especially significant for a country like Lesotho where the labour force is growing 
substantially year by year and under current conditions the economy’s absorptive 
capacity is severely limited. Other tenets of 1990’s Bank policy were also a significant 
part of the PRP, i.e. improving institutional capacity and strengthening the social safety 
net. For example the Bank notes that through ‘experience and analysis’ countries can 
reduce poverty quicker if they focus on empowering and investing in the poor people 
(invest in human resources). One significant way to do this, apart from education is 
through health.
Within the context of poverty reduction the 1995 Poverty Reduction Action Plan, 
as previously mentioned chose to focus on specific aspects of the health care sector, 
namely:
• Exempt children less than five from fees
• Introduce a free basic health service
• Increase geographic equity
• Allow local facilities to retain certain fees119
N o specific reasons were given as to why the Bank chose to focus on these particular 
aspects of health care. With the overarching mission of the Bank being poverty reduction, 
logic suggests that the Bank, in choosing these particular aspects was aiming to do just
119 Hassan, 12.
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this. The Banks health policies generally tend to be based “on disease-specific morbidity 
and mortality needs”120 while concentrating on investing in priority areas.
A major component of the 1995 PRP with regards to the health sector was the 
Second Population, Health and Nutrition Project, a US$12.1 million project funded 
primarily by the ID A :121 although it should also be noted that the European Union and 
the Irish government provided parallel funding. As noted in the project evaluation 
summary the project objectives ranged from decentralizing health service infrastructure, 
reducing rates of population growth, reducing morbidity and mortality, enhancing 
economic efficiency of the health care system and strengthening support systems for 
health planning.
These objectives provide the framework for the specific goals outlined with 
regards to the health care system in the 1995 PRP. Geographic equity is essence is the 
decentralization of the health service infrastructure, while enhancing economic efficiency 
and introducing a free basic health care system can be related to exempting children less 
than five from fees. Allowing local clinics to retain certain fees can be seen as 
strengthening support systems for health care planning: strengthening support essentially 
means promoting local quality improvements at health facilities. The goal of local 
facilities retaining fees was to support medical facilities in increasing “revenue utilization 
to recover 15% of recurrent costs.”122 Therefore, the justifications for focusing on certain 
aspects of the health care industry within the PRP are all validated by the Bank ’s over­
arching objectives as put forward through the Second Population, Health and Nutrition 
Project.
120 World Bank, Implementation Completion Report. Lesotho #18507. (Washington. World Bank, 1998), 1
121 World Bank, 1.
122 World Bank, Implementation Completion Report. Lesotho #18507. (Washington. World Bank, 1998), 4.
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The next chapter focuses on the qualitative methods used to gauge the 
effectiveness of the 1995 PRP. Approximately 3 months were spent in Lesotho 
conducting field research primarily though interviews. The results of these interviews are 
chronicled in the next chapter which will provide insight on Bank effectiveness in 
Lesotho.
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Y. INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPTION
As already established, the World Bank notes that in order to improve the health care 
sector it is essential to improve service delivery by strengthening sectoral and local 
institutions, which in essence means improving or strengthening public service delivery. 
Public service delivery on a micro-level, because on a micro-level, improvements are far 
more visible than on a macro-level, the changes (with regards to health care) that the 
1995 PRP sought to make fall into this category. This chapter using the aid of interviews 
conducted over a three day period between September 29th and October 1st 2004, will 
outline the specific responses to various questions as posed to several prominent 
members of the ‘health community’ in Lesotho.
The questions were designed to aid the process of gauging the effectiveness of the 
World Bank’s stated health care developmental objectives as outlined in the 1995 Poverty 
Reduction Action Plan. The format followed will be to state the question posed, and 
detail the collective responses of those individuals who were capable of responding to the 
question.
In the course of researching Bank policies in Lesotho several key people were 
consulted with regards to various initiatives undertaken by the government in conjunction 
with the World Bank. As previously noted, in order to fully ascertain World Bank 
effectiveness it was crucial that right group of people be interviewed: those selected for 
the interview process include Bank representatives, health professionals and government 
officials.
The following people were interviewed: the Director of Health Planning in the 
Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, the Medical Superintendent at Queen Elizabeth II
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Medical Hospital, a former liaison of the World Bank in the Ministry of Health, now at 
UNFPA, Lesotho, the former Deputy Governor of the Reserve Bank of South Africa and 
former vice president and secretary of the World Bank Group now Minister of Finance 
and Economic Planning and the current liaison to the World Bank in Maseru, Lesotho. In 
what follows, I have summarized the answers provided by these people to the questions 
previously noted on pages 51-52.
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1. Are you aware o f any projects or policies implemented by the World Bank to improve 
the health sector over the last ten years?
The general consensus with regards to this specific question was that there have been 
several policies implemented by the Bank in conjunction with the government of 
Lesotho. The most prominent project noted was the fore mentioned Health Sector Reform 
Program, also mentioned was the Second Population, Health and Nutrition Project 
implemented as part of the 1995 Poverty Assessment and recently completed in 1998. On 
a minor level, it was noted that Adaptable Project Loans (APL’s), funded by the Bank 
were also implemented.
2. Of the policies mentioned, what was the most prominent project/ policy over this 
period?
All those interviewed with regards to this question named the on-going Health Sector 
Reform Project as the most prominent policy over the last decade. Differences were noted 
with regards to the most prominent aspect of the Health Sector Reform Project. As ‘part 
and parcel’ of this project, the development of the referral health system was cited as a 
great achievement, while the focus on capacity building (namely through training and 
other such workshops) was also noted as being a success.
3. Are you aware that discussions between the government o f Lesotho and the World 
Bank led to the formulation ofpolicy designed, in part to invest in the health sector in the 
1995 PRP?
For various reasons, none of those interviewed were specifically involved with the 
implementation of the 1995 PRP. They did however have first hand knowledge of the 
goings on of the Bank and the intricacies surrounding past and current developmental 
projects. Those interviewed have only been in their respective positions for on average
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five years, so could therefore comment only on what they knew pertaining to the health 
sector: although several of those interviewed attested to the implementation of the 1994 
CAS, which was used as the basis for the 1995 PRP.
4. In your own opinion what has contributed to the challenges faced by the World Bank 
(if in fact there were any) in implementing its projects/ policies?
The challenges faced by the Bank in implementing its policies in Lesotho according to 
those interviewed are two-fold. Firstly that of bureaucracy. Bureaucracy in the 
government, specifically the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare acts as a deterrent to 
achieving prescribed goals. Along with this comes the notion of lack of leadership in the 
government, coordination between government officials and those on the ground is non­
existent, to the point where the real issues that need to be tackled are being over looked.
This bureaucratic inefficiency leads to a lack of accountability; accountability in 
all aspects but especially with regards to personnel, specifically in retaining qualified 
personnel to staff the health sector. Doctors and nurses are more mobile and almost 
always leave Lesotho for greener pastures123 in South Africa, to places like Bloemfontein, 
Johannesburg and Cape Town; this in turn leads to the hiring of foreign doctors.
These foreign doctors and nurses originate predominantly from Cuba, China and 
the Democratic Republic of Congo, although other doctors and nurses can be found from 
all across Africa. The Chinese doctors that come to work at QEII hospital are part of a 
bilateral govemment-govemment agreement between the two respective governments. It 
was also noted that there has historically been a distinct lack of resources in the health 
sector; an example given was that at QE II hospital (the biggest and most resourceful of
123 By greener pastures, what is meant is that medical jobs in South Africa provide greater job security and 
more competitive wages.
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the hospitals in Lesotho) there are no facilities/ instruments for radiotherapy, there is no 
oncologist and there is often a lack of hot steam.124 In fact steam truly represents the 
plethora of issues surrounding the lack of fundamental resources at the hospital: in 
medical terms steam in necessary for sterilization and is subsequently used in autoclaves. 
The steam is generated by boilers, which are powered by diesel. Therefore no steam in 
actuality means that there is no diesel to fuel the boilers. The fact that the diesel was 
allowed to get that low can be attributed to the gauges that discern levels of diesel, they 
are broken and have not functioned for a substantially long time: an overall lack of 
resources.
5. And how do you think you can correct these problems?
The most forthcoming answer to this question was that the entire system, from top to 
bottom needs a complete overhaul. A complete systems overhaul, it was hoped would 
lead to greater transparency in the bureaucratic process and in doing so the systems of 
primary health care would be upheld, i.e. supervisory and support mechanisms and 
established guidelines would be pushed to the forefront and sustained.
With regards to personnel, there is no adequate system of retention. It was 
suggested that instead of spending tax payer’s money on foreign doctors (foreign doctors 
are given an allowance and free accommodation) more local doctors and nurses need to 
be trained. Once they have been trained, local packages for them can be increased; this 
could potentially act as an incentive to make them stay in Lesotho as opposed to crossing 
the border into South Africa, thus halting the significant ‘medical brain drain.’ Part of 
these packages could include good quality government housing (which is scarce to non­
124 Hot steam as it relates to medical surgery, no steam means no surgery can be performed.
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existent), especially in the more rural, mountainous areas of Lesotho i.e. Mohales Hoek, 
Qacha’s Nek and Quthing.
6. Have the indicators o f ‘well-being’ i.e. life expectancy, child mortality, improved, 
decreased or stayed the same over the last ten years?
The general view was that indicators of ‘well-being’ have decreased over the last few 
years, (although no conclusive statistics were given). With the primary reason given was 
that the HIV/ Aids pandemic has gripped Lesotho over the last decade. To verify this, 
research showed that for example the average life expectancy in Lesotho has steadily 
declined from 2000. In the year 2000, life expectancy was 50.79 years, 2001 48.84 years, 
2002 47 years and 2003 36.94 years.125 Child mortality at birth has also increased: 2002 
82.57 deaths per 1,000 live births, 2004 85.22 deaths per 1,000 live births.126
7. What is the average life expectancy in Lesotho?
None of those interviewed knew off-hand what the average life expectancy in Lesotho 
was. I was referred to World Bank and other such sources to find out the average life 
expectancy. However assumptions were made that life expectancy was between 40 -  45 
years. According the CIA World fact-book, the average life expectancy for the total
1 9 7Basotho population is 36.81 years, with an equal 36.81 breakdown between males and 
females. Statistics regarding the discrepancy between life expectancy in rural areas 
versus life expectancy in urban areas were unavailable.
125 Index Mundi. “Lesotho life expectancy at birth chart.” Sept 28 2004. Online. Available from
http ://www. indexmundi .com/g/g.aspx? c=lt&v=3 0
126 CIA: The World Fact Book, “Lesotho.” Sept 28 2004. Online. Available from
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/lt.html
127 It should be noted that 36.81 years is a decline from the 36.94 average life expectancy in 2003.
128 CIA World Fact Book. Sept 28 2004. Online. Available from
http://www.indexmundi.com/lesotho/life_expectancy_at_birth.html
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8. What is the leading cause of death for adults in Lesotho?
When discussing the leading cause of death for adults in Lesotho, those interviewed drew 
my attention to the fact that the health environment in Lesotho was characterized by a 
combination of high fertility and high mortality, a preponderance of infectious diseases, 
as well as both forms of malnutrition, chronic and acute.
This said, without a doubt the leading cause of death for adults in Lesotho was 
given as HIV/ Aids. It was noted that over the last decade or so HIV and other Aids 
related deaths are responsible for approximately 30% of deaths in Lesotho. The main 
reason given for continuing upsurge in Aids related deaths was that the mentality of the 
general populace makes the spread of HIV much easier; it was noted that the majority of 
the population in Lesotho are “stuck” in their traditional ways, and for example disregard 
the whole notion of sexual contraceptives. Although not the leading cause of death, it was 
noted that there has been an increase in tuberculosis related deaths.
9. Is there a good working relationship between those implementing the desired goals 
(i.e. doctors) and the administrators (i.e. government)?
The answer to this question was simply no; there is no working relationship between 
those implementing the desired goals and the administrators. The entire relationship was 
noted as being very laborious and bureaucratic. Those interviewed noted that health 
professionals i.e. doctors are not involved enough in the decision making process, the 
system therefore has become highly centralized and too operational, leading again to a 
lack of accountability. Mechanisms of evaluation within the Lesotho government are 
inadequate to non-existent.
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The medical superintendent gave as an example that she can not dismiss the
hospital janitor for incompetence. She would have to “get permission” from those above
her in the Ministry: conditions were described as being highly centralized with senior
authorities in the Ministry seeking complete control. To clarify this notion of
centralization, the medical superintendent gave another example regarding the foreign
doctors that are working at QE II hospital. She noted that as medical superintendent she
does not know the number of Cuban doctors working at the hospital, she is privy to this
information, whereas she was certain the Ministry knew. This highly centralized system;
it was felt undermines the authority and role of the medical superintendent.
10. Do health professionals have any input into projects that may be planned by the 
government in consultation with the World Bank, or is it merely imposed from above?
With regards to input into projects/ policies it was by and large assumed that there was
some sort of consultation with the health professionals and the government (in this case
the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, especially with regards to coordination and
implementation. The question that was posed back was is the amount of consultation
adequate enough? It was noted that there is consultation to a certain extent: for example
with regards to the referral clinics,129 it is assumed that the health professionals who have
a stake in the implementation of the clinics would be consulted in any policy or project
decisions.
Others interviewed noted that there is consultation, but primarily between the 
Director General (D.G) and the Ministry.130 This effect, according to those interviewed 
leads to an under-representation of the rest of the health professionals in the consultation
129 Referral clinics and filter clinics are the same type o f clinic, the only difference being the terminology
used to describe them.
130 The D.G Dr. Ramathlapheng was unavailable for comment during the time that was spent in Lesotho, as
he was out o f  the country.
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process. Since, historically the health professionals have been under-represented, it was 
suggested that the D.G and the Ministry endeavour to involve nurses and doctors (i.e. 
those on the ground) in the consultation process.
This top-down, centralized approach according to those interviewed does not 
stimulate integration. The whole system was described as a type of Tine-ministry,’ in 
which the World Bank deals with the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, from the 
which point the Ministry deals with the D.G, and then the D.G. informs the rest of the 
health professionals what the particular objectives are. Therefore, while there is a degree 
of consultation between the Ministry and the health professionals, the general consensus 
was that the levels of consultation were inadequate.
The last group of questions were designed to specifically determine whether the 
World Bank has been effective in fulfilling its stated health care developmental 
objectives as outlined in the 1995 Poverty Reduction Action Plan. Again, it should be 
stated that by effective, one refers to the previously mentioned definition of effectiveness 
as strengthening the long term ability o f human resources: that is, the extent to which the 
health care system has evolved and is relatively free of social and economic restraints.
11. Are children under five exempt from health fees?
The straightforward answer to this question was no, children in contemporary Lesotho 
are not entirely exempt from paying health fees. It was noted that children have to pay 
M5 (5 Maloti)131 per weeks hospital services, i.e. as long as the necessary referrals are 
done within a one week period, the children are covered, however once one week has 
passed, children have to pay an additional M5 for any other hospital services.
131 1USS = 6 Maloti.
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Is there free basic health coverage in Lesotho?
Along the same lines, those interviewed concurred that there is no free basic health 
coverage in Lesotho. While children have to pay M5, adults are required to pay M10 per 
week’s hospital services, with the same conditions attached with regards to referrals and 
other such services.
12. If the answer is no: in your opinion is free health coverage a realistic goal/if the 
answer is yes: how has this been successfully implemented?
It was determined that idealistically it would be nice to hope for free health coverage. 
Those interviewed pointed to the fact that some of the worlds most developed countries 
do not have a system whereby health coverage is entirely free, so essentially it is almost 
asking too much for Lesotho (one of the poorer countries in the world) to have this free 
health coverage as part of its social security system.
Realistically it was felt that the health system that is in place, although not perfect 
by any means is the closest to “free health coverage” that Lesotho has come to since 
independence, and hopefully there is room for improvement in the near future.
13. Is there geographic equity in hospitals/ clinics throughout Lesotho?
This question was answered on two levels. On one hand it was noted that there has been 
an increase clinics/ hospitals from the stand point of mere infrastructure. At the top of this 
list was the implementation of ‘filter clinics’ that have been built across Lesotho over the 
last decade. According to those interviewed, filter clinics serve to upgrade the level of 
existing health centres, making them more capable of technical procedures. There are 
currently three in Lesotho, with the one in Maputsoe being open 24 hours a day.
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On the other hand those interviewed acknowledged that mere infrastructure does 
not mean the quality of the health care has improved. Indeed it was noted that as 
geographic equity has increased, the rural areas have been less served, in the sense that 
there is no staff to serve in the remote outposts throughout Lesotho. This lack of 
personnel can again be attributed to the ‘medical brain drain,’ that is, the majority of 
nurses and doctors seeking greener pastures in South Africa. The health professionals 
interviewed also mentioned that rural clinics often become dilapidated due to lack of 
maintenance: a prime reason given for this problem was that the maintenance aspect of 
the clinics is often out-sourced to non-profit organizations and not directly to the 
ministry.
Essentially there has been an increase in geographic equity since the 
implementation of the 1995 PRP: but according to the definition of effectiveness132 this 
increase in geographic equity has not strengthened the long term ability of human 
resources. While the health care system has been improved from an infrastructural stand 
point, it has not developed the capacity to sustain long term human resources which is 
essential for the health care sector in Lesotho.
14. Do local clinics retain the income that they receive?
No, local clinics in general do not retain the income that they receive. It was noted that 
even if they do, the percentage would be very low around approximately 5-6% of 
recurrent costs. Local government collects the funds and subsequently makes decisions 
on expenditure. It was determined that funds received are consolidated and collected as 
revenue for the government: the funds are then dispersed regionally in a manner seen fit
132 Strengthening the long term ability o f  human resources: that is, the extent to which the health care 
system has been improved over a period o f  time.
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by the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning. However it was also noted that, the 
fact that the government collects the revenue, does not affect the general allocation of the 
funds, which is handled locally.
Another tenable reason for why local clinics do not retain the income that they 
receive was given by the Minister of Finance and Economic Planning. It was noted that if 
the clinics did retain the income that they received, this would greatly diminish certain 
aspects of control and accountability. For example, if funds went missing nobody in 
government would be accountable for them: local retention would reduce transparency, 
given the structure of the current administrative system.
While the responses to the questions are not the ‘holy grail’ to World Bank 
effectiveness in Lesotho, they do paint a picture of how the 1995 PRP has been effective/ 
ineffective. The next chapter, taking the interviews into consideration, will discuss in 
correlation with the research questions posed, the results previously outlined in this 
section with regards to the 1995 PRP. For clarity’s sake the research questions posed are 
the following: has the Bank been effective in fulfilling its stated health care 
developmental objectives as outlined in the 1995 Poverty Reduction Action Plan? If so, 
how has it been effective? If not, what can be done to make it more effective? Lastly, 
how does the Bank recognise the importance of local developmental goals?
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VI. DISCUSSION
Using information gathered from independent academics, World Bank documentation 
and from interviews conducted in Lesotho, this chapter will attend to several issues. It 
will firstly discuss the goals of the 1995 PRP against the stated hypotheses. Secondly this 
chapter will discuss important assumptions with regards to external factors that may have 
played a role in determining the effectiveness of the PRP. If it is determined that the PRP 
was ineffective, the notions of coordination and implementation will be analysed to show 
how increased coordination and better implementation might have improved the overall 
effectiveness of foreign aid. Lastly, this chapter will suggest alternative methods to 
enhance the overall effectiveness of the Bank’s policy implementation.
Poverty reduction as part of prescribed ‘developmental packages’ has evolved. No 
longer is poverty reduction one dimensional, now poverty alleviation (through 
development) stresses amongst other things education, economic growth and overall 
‘good health.’ While poverty reduction in itself embodies a clear goal, it should be 
realised that in actuality there is no precise road to perfect aid effectiveness. However 
there are potential solutions to poverty reduction and this is precisely what the 1995 PRP 
aimed to be, a latent solution to the multi-dimensional aspects of poverty in Lesotho. The 
goal of assessing the effectiveness of the World Bank in Lesotho is ideally meant to 
provide feedback to improve the future projects and policies of the Bank in Lesotho.
Before delving into the discussion surrounding the 1995 PRP, it is important to 
again briefly define and highlight themes that have been prominent throughout this paper. 
The main hypothesis of this paper asks the question: has the World Bank been effective 
in fulfilling its stated health care developmental objectives as outlined in the 1995
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Poverty Reduction Action Plan? Effectiveness in this context is being defined as 
strengthening the long term ability o f human resources: that is, the extent to which the 
health care system has evolved and is relatively free o f social and economic restraints.
Using this definition of effectiveness the first two goals of the 1995 PRP, 
exempting children less than five from paying fees and introducing a free basic health 
care system have largely been ineffective. The fact remains that there is no free health 
coverage for anyone in Lesotho. As is the case not only in the majority of countries in 
southern Africa but the majority of countries globally, everyone has to pay for medical 
attention. Consider a country like the United States, the leading economy in the world 
with a GDP of $ 37,800,133 yet even here children do not enjoy free medical care. In fact 
it is only as recently as under President Clinton that the proposed Universal Health Care 
bill was bom in an attempt to make health care a right of every American citizen.
As noted by those interviewed, for a ‘developing’ country like Lesotho the idea of 
free health care as a means to poverty reduction is very idealistic and verges on being 
unrealistic, at least in the foreseeable future. Lesotho does not have the economic and 
social security framework to support and finance free health care. A free health care 
system requires amongst other things a vibrant and constantly growing economy: policies 
and programmes designed to attain better health have historically required a rapidly 
growing industrial economy which goes hand in hand with a reasonably healthy 
economy.
For example, between 1960 and 1980 when the United States made significant 
progress in its health care system: these achievements “were bought at high public cost.
133 CIA: The World Fact Book. “United States.” Oct 11 2004. Online. Available from 
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/us.html
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Social welfare expenditures by all levels of government increased from $52 billion in 
1960 to $428 billion in 1979.”134 Lesotho is not a fully industrialized economy and its 
economy is far from able to afford such staggering costs, particularly in the contemporary 
economic climate.
Lesotho does not have free health coverage: but to a certain extent what it does 
have is ‘affordable’ health coverage. This ‘affordable’ health coverage was not an 
initiative of the World Bank. It sort of materialized by default. The notion of affordable is 
also relative: it is not to say that every person in Lesotho can afford the M5 and M10 fees 
imposed by the hospitals, but it is attainable, with the average wage in Lesotho is 
approximately US$500135 per year which is about M3000 per year.
Yes strengthening the long term ability of human resources is an effective means 
of reducing poverty, but what is paramount is that it should be realistically attainable. The 
goal of increasing geographic equity i.e. decentralizing the health system is very 
attainable: and of the four goals prescribed by the 1995 PRP this was the most realistic. 
There has been an increase in the geographic distribution of health centres throughout 
Lesotho, the rural mountainous areas are greater served than they were a decade ago.
In spite of this, the interviews showed that although there has been increased 
geographic equity, this increase has been attained at a cost. This cost is a lack of 
sustainability in terms of maintenance of basic medical standards and a lack of personnel 
to staff the various clinics. As noted in the literature review, where the Bank is central to 
the reform process, the sustainability of this reform is highly questionable. Even if it has
134 S.E. Berki, “Health Care Policy: Lessons from the Past and Issues o f the Future.” Annals o f  the
American Academy o f Political and Social Science. (1983): 233.
135 Light for Lesotho Appeal. Oct 11 2004. Online. Available from
http://www.biblesocietv.ie/lightforlesotho.html
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been proven that health centres “function well, when working in conjunction with referral 
hospitals,”136 and that they “have the capacity to manage more than 90% of the health 
care demands of developing countries,”137 the erosion of gains made does nothing to add 
to the long term sustainability of the medical standards.
The construction of filter clinics has helped to take the pressure off the out-patient 
department of Queen Elizabeth II hospital in Maseru. Out patient usage of the filter 
clinics has increased substantially: for example “comparison of the average use for the 
first 6 months after opening and the past 6 months shows a 78% increase in utilization of 
the Qoaling filter clinic.”138 However current utilization levels nationwide are well below 
what was expected for several reasons. It has been very difficult to encourage patients to 
utilize filter clinics for primary health care: most patients prefer to be treated at Queen 
Elizabeth II hospital, which has better facilities.
Granted the strengthening of the referral system has been given serious attention 
within the package of services being defined in the PRP: and the infrastructure stands to 
this day in places like Qoaling and Leribe to support this. The question is whether these 
infrastructural successes that were achieved over the last ten years can be sustained 
domestically. As already noted there is a strong presence of foreign doctors in Lesotho, 
and there continues to be a strong reliance on non-Basotho doctors and medical staff for 
the management and implementation of crucial medical programmes (most notably the 
HIV/ AIDS programme and the TB inoculation programme).139
Ministry o f Health and Social Welfare, 18.
137 Ministry o f Health and Social Welfare, 18.
138 World Bank, Implementation Completion Report. Lesotho #18507. (Washington. World Bank, 1998), 4.
139 World Bank, Implementation Completion Report. Lesotho #18507. (Washington. World Bank, 1998), ii.
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The question of sustainability can be related to levels of institutional development 
and analysis which are crucial when examining aid effectiveness. Sustainable health 
improvements require strong institutional capacity and analysis. The Operations 
Evaluation Department (OED) has critically noted some shortcomings in the Banks 
approach to health sector reform: “slowness to incorporate good institutional analysis into 
reform design”140 and slowness to better quality of service delivery were both noted as 
areas where the Bank could improve. The Ministry of Health and Social Welfare as an 
institution is very weak, the centralization of this department as noted in the interviews 
makes it very ‘top-down’ which leads communication and coordination problems, and 
apart from the Lesotho Council of NGO’s there is no strong public organization to 
buttress reform projects.
The top down approach to management is generally centred on the centralization 
of decision-making. In contrast the ‘bottom up’ approach tends to more effective at 
promoting self-sufficiency because it empowers those put in the position to make 
decisions, it is inclusive in nature and does not leave anybody constrained or 
‘handicapped’ as the ‘top down’ approach tends to do. For the sake of sustainability, the 
‘bottom up’ approach is considerably more effective at promoting locally based problem 
solving techniques which are crucial for success.
Without good institutional capacity, it becomes very difficult to sustain reform. 
Lack of sustainability inevitably stifles the social and economic growth of the health care 
sector, creating an entity whose framework is considerably flawed. Since 1966, the 
Department of Social Welfare (responsible for ensuring that preventative and 
rehabilitative welfare services are made available on an equal basis to all those in need)
140 Rogers, 50.
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has never had a ‘permanent home.’ Initially the department was housed in the Ministry of 
Health, and then moved to the Ministry of Interior, then the Ministry of Justice and then 
back to the Ministry o f Health.141 Naturally, this movement from ministry to ministry has 
taken away the ability for the ministry to become a stable, coherent and meaningful unit. 
This is an external factor that may have contributed to the lack of institutional capacity in 
Lesotho, therefore limiting the effect of the geographic equity aspect of the 1995 PRP. 
Other such external factors are discussed later on in this chapter.
The strategy of allowing local facilities to retain certain fees: if implemented 
correctly, would definitely ‘strengthen the long term ability of the health care system’ 
economically and socially. By all intents and purposes this goal would promote 
indigenous ownership and institutional development through local government assuming 
a domestic responsibility for their health care facilities: simultaneously improving 
efficiency of local health delivery.
However this goal has been far from effective. The aspiration has been 
ineffective on two levels: the current Minister of Finance noted that if clinics did retain 
the income that they received, this would greatly diminish certain aspects of control and 
accountability. Again this calls into question coordination and communication, surely the 
original purpose of the goal was communicated between the three parties involved (the 
Bank, the ministry and local government). Secondly, through the use of indigenous 
resources it was determined that this practice of retaining local fees was not necessarily 
created to promote efficiency but rather to serve primarily as an accounting
141 Ministry o f  Health and Social Welfare, 66.
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mechanism,142 again a discrepancy that could have been resolved with the greater 
communication.
So where the idea was for these local facilities to recover 15% of recurrent costs, 
they only recover (if anything) between 5-6% of these costs. The World Bank 
Implementation report notes that although the “stated objective was to improve the 
efficiency of service delivery, mechanisms envisioned to achieve efficiency 
improvements were never clearly defined.”143 With regard to the allocation of funds that 
are recovered, the impact of the fees on the patients is hard to determine because 
domestically, there exists no mechanism to measure this effect.
For the greatest gains in aid effectiveness, poverty reduction in all countries 
should be initiated domestically. Domestic success requires fiscal responsibility on ‘all 
fronts.’ This paper is not questioning or criticising the function of the Ministry of Finance 
with regards to the health sector, although it should be noted that the ministry is 
responsible for the allocation of funds regionally. Cause and effect, regional allocation of 
funds in essence determines effectiveness of funds. Since this task is undertaken by the 
ministry: whether the Bank has been effective in fulfilling its stated health care 
developmental objective (allowing local facilities to retain certain fees) as outlined in the 
1995 Poverty Reduction Action Plan is determined by this fiscal policy.
Another factor influencing the effectiveness of this policy is that the “financial 
management staff, are Ministry of Finance cadre which affects their commitment to the 
objectives of the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare:”144 again, lack of coordination 
between the respective ministries. The whole problem is interrelated; there is a lack of
142 World Bank, 5.
143 World Bank, Implementation Completion Report. Lesotho #18507. (Washington. World Bank, 1998), 4.
144 World Bank, Implementation Completion Report. Lesotho #18507. (Washington. World Bank, 1998), 4.
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coordination between ministries and a lack of commitment to sound leadership within the 
MOHSW. It can be argued that the leadership displayed by the MOHSW (health 
professionals feel that there is a lack of consultation when it comes to project 
implementation) is indirectly affecting the lack of coordination between the two 
ministries in question, vis-a-vis improvements in the financial management area.
One of the recurring themes throughout this chapter is that the prevailing socio­
economic conditions in Lesotho have indirectly affected effectiveness of the 1995 PRP. 
Whether it is the evolution of specific ministries (hampering institutional capacity) or 
domestic fiscal policy, these external factors have played a significant part in the Bank’s 
general policy failure.
Sub-Saharan Africa unlike any other region in the world has consistently been the 
poorest and most under-developed region in the world. Between 1965 and 1999 Sub- 
Saharan Africa saw no increase in per capita incomes,145 and like Lesotho, Sub-Saharan 
Africa’s socio-economic situation has been affected by external factors. Non-oil 
exporters in Africa (Lesotho being one of them lost a significant amount (cumulative 
120%) of their GDP between 1965 and 1997 as a result of oil price fluctuations in the 
global market.146 This fact merely serves to illustrate how on a macro-level, external 
factors contribute to overall policy success or failure.
Some of the external factors that will be mentioned have been briefly touched on; 
others fall into place through a sort o f ‘domino’ effect, highlighting the connections 
between these factors. As previously mentioned Lesotho’s political climate has been 
marred by instability: since independence there have been several coup attempts and the
145 Rogers, 21.
146 Rogers, 21.
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1990’s brought even more instability. What was generally viewed as a one sided political 
election in 1998 led to increased “conflict over the allocation of political power.”147 So 
disruptive and chaotic was this conflict that South Africa and other members of the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) had to send troops to quell riots in 
September of 1998.
This political upheaval came at a time when the 1995 PRP was being 
implemented: therefore any potential gains made in the health sector prior to this could 
have significantly been reduced by this event. The “political upheaval gave rise to certain 
political economic structures that influenced the functioning of civil service and the 
MOHSW.”148 There exists no concrete measurement to determine if this naturally was 
the case, however one should be aware of the effect of an incident of this magnitude. This 
fact strengthens the argument made by critics who argue that political climate affects aid 
effectiveness.
Basic economic theory suggests that improved socio-economic growth creates a 
more conducive atmosphere for aid effectiveness. Implementation of policy is affected by 
levels of what the Bank refers to as the ‘pillars of development;’ creating a good 
investment climate and empowering and investing in the people.149 These two ‘pillars’ 
are considered necessary for socio-economic growth: Lesotho is therefore at a 
disadvantage when it comes to the ‘evolution’ of the health care system because it has not 
experienced such growth, again diminishing and possibly constraining the 1995 PRP.
Socio-economic growth can be hampered by among other things major epidemics 
or natural disasters. In the case of Lesotho, during the period in question there were two
147 Hassan, 1.
148 World Bank, 6.
149 Rogers, 26.
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major droughts in 1992 and 1998: the latter drought causing severe instances of 
malnutrition, typhoid and diarrhoea particularly among children and the elderly. Again 
this is an external factor that perhaps adversely affected the effectiveness of the 1995 
PRP.
Other external factors although not as significant as those already mentioned do 
play a part in determining the extent to which the health care system has evolved and is 
relatively free of social and economic restraints. Constant population growth rate and 
having strong political commitment at all levels; in this context has some bearing on aid 
effectiveness. The Bank cites Lesotho’s population growth rate at 1.0% annually,150 even 
with 1.0% growth in a country like Lesotho (with limited resources), this can put a 
sizeable strain on local facilities, particularly health facilities. For comparative purposes a 
1.0% annual increase in a country like Malawi would not have the same constraining 
effect on local resources, primarily because Malawi’s institutions can absorb the costs 
and effects of this population increase, whereas, unfortunately Lesotho’s institutions can 
not.
Having a strong political commitment at all levels of government and society is 
another external factor that could adversely affect aid effectiveness. Where noted scholars 
(Michelle Adams, Halsey Rogers and David Dollar) point to the need for beneficiaries to 
be involved in project implementation: without strong political commitment this process 
is severely hampered. Tony Killick’s definition of government ownership, mentioned 
earlier in the literature review comes to mind when discussing the notion of strong 
political commitment:
150 World Bank. “Lesotho Data and Statistics.” Oct 12 2004. Online. Available from
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/LESQTHOEXTN/ 
0„menuPK:356055~pagePK: 141132~piPK: 141109~theSitePK:356029,00.html
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Government ownership is at its strongest when the political leadership and its advisers, 
with broad support among agencies o f state and civil society, decide of their own volition 
that policy changes are desirable, choose what these changes should be and when they 
should be introduced, and where these changes become built into parameters o f policy 
and administration which are generally accepted as desirable.151
Project ownership in this context is the best way to gauge political commitment
because successful ownership involves all the leading actors in society (political leaders,
state agencies, civil society and working professionals): and domestic policies initiated by
these leading actors do have a pervasive influence on the whole system of foreign aid.
The 1995 Poverty Reduction Plan was unsuccessful in implementing its stated
goals. It is extremely difficult to assess blame or even credit to the World Bank, because
so many other factors came into play. Some gains were made, but these gains in
comparison to the goals set through the 1994 CAS were far below the expected outcome.
External factors may have eroded much of the gains made, but ultimately this paper
asserts that the 1995 PRP failed in part because of a lack of coordination between the
respective parties which led to unsatisfactory project implementation.
Coordination is defined in the Oxford English Dictionary as “bringing the
different elements of (a complex activity or organization) into an efficient
relationship.”152 The key phrase in the forementioned definition is “efficient
relationship:” efficiency encompasses all the different elements (coordination,
cooperation and implementation) working towards a single goal. Whether it is
coordination between the Bank and the government or coordination between the
government and in this case health professionals, efficiency is crucial. In the field of
development, coordination or levels of coordination with regards to bilateral and
151 Tony Killick, Aid and the Political Economy o f Policy Change (New York: Routledge, 1998), 76.
152 Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 180.
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multilateral aid often single-handedly affect the immediate and long term effectiveness of 
project specific aid.
Several examples of successful coordination between the World Bank and local 
governments can be found over the last few years. In 1996, the Bank in partnership with 
the Mexican government initiated the very successful ‘Progresa” project. This project 
provided “immediate financial transfers to the rural poor while at the same time 
promoting investment in children’s human capital via increased schooling and improved 
health and nutrition status.”153
Similarly the Bank, using its good working relationship with the Bangladeshi 
government has supported numerous projects over the last thirty years that has led to a 
decrease in the infant mortality rate from approximately 140 deaths per 1000 live births 
to 71 deaths per 1000 live births.154 Bangladesh is “the only one among the world’s 20 
poorest countries to record a sustained reduction in birth rates over the past twenty 
years.”155 This too is largely to do with the good relationship between the Bank and the 
Bangladeshi government.
While there may be other reasons why the 1995 PRP was unsuccessful in 
Lesotho, lack of coordination was clearly an issue. Those interviewed noted that in 
Lesotho there has historically been a lack of coordination between the MOHSW and the 
health professionals. So prevalent is this lack of coordination that those ‘on the ground’ 
view the MOHSW as a deterrent to achieving prescribed goals. The bureaucracy within 
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coordination. It was also noted that lack of coordination leads to a plethora of other 
problems, the most significant being lack of accountability.
Another aspect of this lack of coordination can be found when looking at the 
relationship that exists between ministries. The relationship between the ministries 
highlights the problem of inadequate consultation, which is an indirect consequence of 
poor coordination. For the goals of the 1995 PRP to be met effectively government wide 
coordination was necessary: i.e. there needed to be cooperation between the MOHSW 
and the Ministry of Finance, MOHSW and the Ministry of Planning. The Bank Project 
Implementation Assessment notes that “the difficulty of achieving inter-ministerial and 
inter-agency cooperation was underestimated in some instances.”156 Clearly the MOHSW 
did not put sufficient energy into inter-ministerial cooperation, which again attests to the 
lack of coordination.
The centralization of the administrative system (idea of a Tine-ministry’) has 
made the system too top down and authoritative to the point that health professionals are 
rarely consulted in matters where their opinion could potentially make a difference. For 
example, had the Bank encouraged the MOHSW to consult health professionals then 
maybe they would have been more actively involved in the consultation process: this 
being the case, maybe the 1995 PRP would have paid greater attention to HIV and the 
problems associated with HIV epidemic in Lesotho. Greater attention could have been 
given to more cost-effective methods to tackle other more pressing problems affecting the 
health climate i.e. the high rates of fertility and mortality and the chronic and acute 
malnutrition problems.
156 World Bank, Implementation Completion Report. Lesotho #18507. (Washington. World Bank, 1998), 5.
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“Government interventions in Africa have so far become discredited, not because 
there is an effective alternative in the form of an effective market mechanism but because 
of inefficient management, poor results and misallocation of resources.” 157 Inefficient 
management and misuse of resources brings us to project implementation. It has already 
been established that there was a distinct lack of coordination particularly between the 
MOHSW and the health professionals: lack of coordination seriously affects 
implementation.
The degree of implementation has historically been affected by the non-lending 
tools of development i.e. advice, capacity building and analysis. Implementation of 
policy is normally solely handled by the respective ministry (in this case the MOHSW). It 
was the responsibility of the MOHSW to ensure that the right analytical tools and advice 
be made available with regards to the 1995 PRP; in this area they failed.
Indeed it was noted that “technical assistance was one of the largest areas of 
underspending. This low disbursement is not unique to this project and is a more generic 
problem that the MOHSW faces -  the ministry actually underspends on its own budget, 
and fails to implement many planned interventions.” 158 The idea of a ministry 
underspending on its own budget clearly illustrates poor planning and poor financial 
management. All of which could have potentially been avoided had there been better 
communication between the respective parties. The Bank should bear some responsibility 
for this: as the organization that is funding the project, evaluation systems should have 
been put in place that would have been able to notice and rectify the problem.
157 Benno J. Ndulu. “Governance and Economic Management.” Strategies for African Development
(Berkeley, University o f  California Press. 1986), 102.
158 World Bank, Implementation Completion Report. Lesotho #18507. (Washington. World Bank, 1998), 6.
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Another example of poor implementation can be found in relation to the ‘filter 
clinics.’ The construction of several filter clinics was significantly delayed due to the 
failure of Bank officials to take into consideration the complex property laws of Lesotho. 
This resulted in not only a significant delay in project implementation but also a rise in
159construction costs.
The interviews stressed high staff turnover as a weakness of the current health 
system: but this high staff turnover also indirectly affects project implementation. This 
staff turnover in combination with poor leadership impacted negatively on the 
sustainability of the goals of the 1995 PRP. This consequently negated the capacity for 
implementation, and therefore the objectives that were put in place could not be sustained 
or properly implemented. “The high staff turnover also resulted in a lack of institutional 
memory,”160 ‘institutional memory can be directly linked with the ‘brain drain,’ that is 
staff who leave Lesotho to go to neighbouring South Africa for employment.
In the case of the 1995 PRP, there were clear fundamental problems with 
coordination and implementation. Coordination and project implementation levels were 
unsatisfactory to the point that they negated potential gains that the 1995 PRP could have 
made. The question that needs to be answered here is to what extent is the World Bank 
responsible for ensuring that levels of coordination and implementation are successfully 
implemented by local governments?
The Bank as the foremost agent of development in southern Africa should be 
responsible for ensuring that levels of coordination and implementation are successfully 
implemented by local governments. Scholarly literature and the Bank’s own rhetoric
159 World Bank, 6.
160 World Bank, 6.
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glorify project ownership as the means for aid to be more effective. World Bank 
evaluations carried out by the OED have highlighted “the importance of client and 
beneficiary participation in the design and implementation of the project for achieving 
satisfactory outcomes,”161 and a literally perfect example of this (the Peru Roads Project 
was given the World Bank’s President award for excellence) can be found in the Peru 
rural roads project which is sighted as being a good example of “responsiveness to client 
needs, cost-effectiveness and innovation.”162 For this project to represent the ultimate 
success, the Bank surely took the responsibility to accurately find out ‘client needs’ and 
to facilitate cooperation with the Ministry of Transportation in Peru.
This said, following research in the field, it has been determined that a great deal 
can be done to enhance the overall effectiveness of the Banks policy implementation in 
Lesotho. First and foremost, it is imperative for the World Bank through its office located 
in Maseru to establish an effective evaluation mechanism that is inclusive in nature. 
Inclusive in the sense that not only should there be progress reports on field operations, 
but these evaluations should monitor staff turnover and movement. In this way better 
methods can be devised to ensure that there is some sort of staff retention, which in turn 
contributes to project continuity. Far too often senior staff in the health sector leave, and 
no one is immediately available to step in and carry out the required tasks, and this slows 
down project implementation significantly. A further step could be taken to ensure future 
project sustainability by focusing on nurturing local management specifically to support 
Bank operations: ideally this could be done by the Bank in conjunction with the Ministry 
of Health and Social Welfare.
161 Rogers, 55.
162 Rogers, 56.
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Staff retention was clearly one of the more contentious issues raised during the 
interview process. Something needs to be done fairly quickly to slow down the medical 
‘brain drain’ that is affecting Lesotho. What better way to promote ownership than 
devising methods to retain staff? Not only does retaining staff strengthen the capacity for 
ownership but it also goes a long way to ensuring project sustainability. Several methods 
could be used to retain staff: a greater incentive package for starters. It would be in the 
best interests for the MOHSW to focus on improving local staff packages in terms of 
salaries and benefits, in this way hopefully the allure of neighbouring South Africa will 
not be that great for medical staff. The idea of bringing in foreign doctors (at extremely 
high salaries) does not make sense in terms of sustainability because eventually these 
doctors leave, and their previously occupied positions remain empty.
Clearly decentralization is necessary for the MOHSW to become more effective. 
Decentralization could lead to more effective management techniques, and would 
hopefully lead to the creation of some sort of Health information management system, 
which could provide accurate information and statistics to organizations like the World 
Bank and other such donors. The current environment is one in which medical data is 
often incomplete and inaccurate, primarily because of irregular data from institutions 
within and outside government. Decentralization (for arguments sake) would also spread 
risk and accountability, with no one organ of the MOHSW being responsible for every 
aspect o f  the MOHSW.
If the Bank is to be effective in future operations, greater awareness of the 
problems on the ground need to be identified. This awareness is raised through greater 
coordination between the MOHSW and the Bank. It is an understatement to say that there
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needs to be greater cooperation between these two entities. Bureaucratic efficiency needs 
to be improved; perhaps a thorough revamping of the MOHSW is necessary for this to be 
achieved, but in some way or another everybody needs to be involved in the decision 
making process, and in the socio-economic landscape of Lesotho, this can only be 
achieved through greater consultation and cooperation.
Tony Killick says that domestic policies in the aid recipient countries of sub- 
Saharan Africa, though not the only factor, play the most important role in determining 
aid effectiveness. The Bank needs to have a greater understanding of domestic policies 
and issues (in the case of the 1995 PRP, health) to ensure maximum project effectiveness. 
At the time of project formulation, Bank officials should have realised that Lesotho was 
(and continues to be) in the midst of an HIV epidemic. As noted in the interviews HIV 
and other HIV related deaths have been the leading causes of death in Lesotho over the 
last decade: therefore more attention should perhaps have been given to preventative 
measures or to strengthening the support mechanisms in order to deal with this epidemic. 
Lesotho has one of the highest HIV prevalence rates in the world; combine this with the 
migratory labour that has become a staple of the Lesotho economy163 and you have a 
pandemic that spreads nation wide and even across the border into South Africa. It would 
have strengthened the PRP to focus on the linkage between HIV and poverty. If the HIV 
problem were somehow dealt with, life expectancy in Lesotho would increase from 36.81 
years to approximately 47 years.
The question as to whether or not the Bank recognized the importance of local 
development goals can be answered fairly simply. There were no concise local 
developmental goals; the goals of the 1995 PRP were prepared by the Bank in
l6;' Note, the gold widows.
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conjunction with the government, but ultimately whose interests were they representing? 
From a theoretical perspective, an institution like the World Bank (although by definition 
and entity representing sovereign states) is one of the “most formally institutionalized 
features of the international economic regime”164 and sometimes these “regimes may 
assume a life of their own, a life independent of the basic casual factors that led to their 
creation in the first place.”165 Theoretically if this were to occur the Bank would not 
always represent client states to the best of its ability.
As a matter of fact, the Bank, under the guise of poverty reduction has had a 
history of prescribing homogenous solutions to perceived problems. At the macro level 
(with the goal being economic growth/ poverty reduction) the Bank has in the past 
implemented structural adjustment programmes across the African continent, some 
succeeded (Uganda and Botswana for example) whereas others failed drastically 
(Nigeria). It is not the intention of this paper to go into specific details as to why these 
structural adjustment programmes failed, but simply to draw attention to the fact that 
local developmental goals are not always taken into consideration when it comes to 
poverty reduction.
The Bank, in the case of Lesotho cannot be held totally responsible for not 
realizing the importance of local developmental goals. The Bank was not made aware of 
these local developmental goals; yes the Bank, through its own credence could have done 
more to become aw are  of what goals needed to be met, but this was essentially the 
responsibility of the government of Lesotho.
164 William Ascher, “New Development Approaches and the Adaptability o f International Agencies: the
Case o f the World Bank.” International Organization. (1983): 415.
165 Ascher. 415.
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As Luttik and White note, aid effectiveness is relative to time, place and situation. 
While the 1995 PRP essentially failed in Lesotho, it may have been successful in every 
other country on the African continent. The goal o f ‘investing in human resources’ at the 
time may have seemed like the right way to improve the health sector, but at the end 
different situations combined to make this task very difficult. When it comes to the health 
sector, the record of the World Bank is not enviable: as Meredith Turshen noted the 
policies of organizations like the World Bank and IMF tend to cause a decline in the 
health care systems of developing countries. Although, there was not a decline in health 
care standards, there was no visible improvement in the health care system.
Cassen believes that aid projects can help the poor, as long as governments and 
donors are on the same page when it comes to implementation. What Cassen fails to 
understand is that even though ‘poverty related projects’ may have a higher rate of return, 
this rate of return is conditional to levels of coordination not only between governments 
and donors, but within governments and between governments and civil society/ 
professionals. While all poverty related strategies do not require centralized government 
planning, they do require as Milton Friedman put it an effective workforce in a favourable 
economic situation.166 Taking nothing away from the hard working health professionals 
in Lesotho, overall the medical cadre is ineffective.
Lastly, to go back to the hypothesis that provided the framework for this study: 
has the Bank been effective in fulfilling its stated health care developmental objectives as 
outlined in the 1995 Poverty Reduction Action Plan? No, the Bank has not been
166 Milton Friedman, “Foreign Economic Aid: means and objectives” reprinted in Jagdish Bhagwati and 
Richard Eckaus, (1970): 64.
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effective: there was a lack of coordination on all fronts which subsequently led to flawed 
implementation.
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VII. CONCLUSION
The principle remit of this paper was to discuss the reasons why the World Bank led 1995 
PRP failed to reach its stated objectives. The Bank was chosen as the main area of focus 
because the Bank at the time was, and continues to be the foremost agent of development 
globally. Lesotho was chosen as the case study primarily because there are not enough 
studies that have focused on this little country in southern Africa. Lesotho also presented 
an opportunity to physically go out into the field and conduct first hand research on the 
Bank’s activities in this country.
The methodology was designed to maximise the validity of the information that 
was needed. Indigenous resources contributed invaluably to the success of this paper, and 
interviews conducted with health professionals and government officials proved to be 
extremely useful in this context. For these same reasons the results of this paper can not 
be generalized. The results of this paper are applicable only to Lesotho for various 
reasons: not only were the socio-economic conditions unique to Lesotho, the literature 
review also showed that the definition of effectiveness is relative, and can be defined in 
numerous ways. In the context of this study it was felt that effectiveness was best defined 
as ‘strengthening the long term ability of human resources: that is, the extent to which the 
health care system has evolved and is relatively free of social and economic restraints.’
Since the focus of this paper was on the World Banks effectiveness in upgrading 
the health care system, this paper began by laying out a theoretical and analytical 
framework for aid effectiveness to be examined. This provided a context in which the 
results of the 1995 PRP could be related to, with regards to how successful or 
unsuccessful this policy was. The literature review, a combination of Bank literature with
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other independent academics established: (a) conditions that are conducive to aid 
effectiveness (ownership, good policy environment in the recipient nation and 
institutional capacity; (b) introduced the idea of coordination as essential to aid 
effectiveness; and (c) that domestic policy is essential to the whole system of aid 
effectiveness.
Overall, health sector performance or health care indices are a solid means of 
judging among other things whether or not poverty reduction policies have been 
effective. Health indices are measurable and thus are normally used in quantitative 
studies, so the 1995 PRP provided a means to initiate a qualitative study, to view the 
project through different lenses: lenses that seek to include the people who participate 
(health professionals) and receive their points of view.
To put the health reforms sought by the Bank into context, an overview of the 
health sector was introduced. The reforms initiated by the Ministry of Health and Social 
Welfare were chronologically listed leading up to the 1994 Country Assessment Strategy 
carried out by the World Bank, which later became the blueprint for the 1995 PRP. The 
1995 PRP set the following goals in health care: (a) exempt children less than five from 
fees; (b) introduce a free basic health care system; (c) increase geographic equity; and (d) 
allow local facilities to retain fees.
Granted in every case study one always feels that perhaps more people could have 
been interviewed or consulted for their input. Perhaps if more people had been 
interviewed the results of the interviews would not have been so conclusive and 
conceivably other pertinent issues may have been raised. With the advantage of 
hindsight, it is safe to say that those interviewed truly represented the general views of
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their specific industries. The Medical Superintendent of Queen Elizabeth II Hospital in 
essence was the voice of all the doctors and nurses working around Lesotho, while those 
with World Bank experience offered opinions based on their combined experience as 
World Bank agents in Lesotho. The Director of Health Planning in the Ministry of Health 
and Social Welfare again was able to call on her experiences within the ministry to 
provide other specifics with regards to policy coordination: while the Minister of Finance 
gave invaluable clarity to the economics of the health system.
Due to time and other such restraints, the questions used in the interviews were 
again designed to maximise validity and to be as concise as possible. The majority of the 
questions (especially when it came to the effectiveness of the 1995 PRP goals) were yes/ 
no questions: but these yes/ no answers required validation: and this is where the real 
information was gathered. Where questions could not be answered (for lack of statistics) 
these statistics were readily available from the World Bank or other such reputable online 
sources.
Turning to the results of the interviews themselves: the results of the interviews 
made two things apparent. Firstly that the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare is 
providing inadequate leadership and this translates itself in the relationship that the 
ministry has with the health professionals. There is a distinct lack of consultation and 
coordination between these two entities which creates an unhealthy working 
environment, particularly for policy formulation which has an adverse effect on aid 
effectiveness. The Bank should have also done more to facilitate greater coordination and 
understanding between itself and the other respective entities.
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Secondly, project implementation was flawed, partly because of this lack of 
coordination, but also due to the inability of the Bank to understand the structure or 
inconsistencies of the MOHSW: at the time the MOHSW was (and continues to be) 
highly centralized. The Bank ideally should have put itself in a position to clearly identify 
and work to improve these flaws that affected its service delivery. Ultimately the 1995 
PRP was not a victim of a ‘bad idea’ but of poor coordination and implementation. Like 
the literature on aid effectiveness suggests: effective aid is aid that is well allocated and 
well implemented (taking into consideration ownership, domestic policies and 
institutional capacity). In this context, Bank funds (US $12.1 million) were well allocated 
but were not well implemented.
One should be cautious about ‘over-generalizing’ the evidence that has been 
presented in this paper. While this paper focuses on Lesotho, one feels that the theoretical 
lessons learned or theoretical conclusions made from this study, to a certain extent help 
provide insight to the ‘bigger problem/ picture’ in international relations. This paper is 
ultimately about the 1995 PRP and what can be learnt from the failure of this policy. 
Studies on aid effectiveness demand a considerable amount of head scratching when it 
comes to offering conclusions because almost every study on aid effectiveness (Knack, 
Holmgren, Killick and World Bank) is different, because they focus on different aspects.
One of the more important and personal reasons why this research was conducted 
was to contribute to the greater understanding of the Lesotho situation: if the results of 
this study potentially contribute to understanding the plight of ‘poverty reduction’ in sub- 
Saharan Africa then something has been achieved. It is no secret that sub-Saharan Africa 
is the poorest region of the world and Lesotho is one of the poorest nations in this region.
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Assumptions are plentiful as to the cause of this region being so ‘under-developed’ and 
poor, but at the end of the day it’s still going to be a poor region, that is not going to 
change unless solutions can be provided.
International financial institutions like the World Bank, although they do bare the 
brunt of responsibility for failed projects in the region, are generally doing a 
commendable job in fighting poverty. Not to say that there is no poverty, but progress is 
being made: with a little ‘policy fine tuning’ Bank aid will hopefully be more effective in 
the years to come. Aid and its effectiveness is a small part of the global battle to alleviate 
poverty, different lenses can be used to view the same problem, and this paper is one of 
many lenses that can be used to view poverty reduction efforts in Lesotho.
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